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The Great Deposit Insurance
Debate
In the stress of the recent banking crisis ... there was a very definite appeal
from bankersfor the United States Government itself to insure all bank
deposits so that no depositor anywhere in the country need have anyfear as
to the loss of his account. Such a guarantee as that would indeed have put a
premium on bad banking. Such a guarantee as that would have made the
Government pay substantially all losses which had been accumulated, whether
by misfortune, by unwise judgment, or by sheer recklessness, and it might
well have brought an intolerable burden upon the Federal Treasury.
—Sen. Robert Bulkley (n-OH),
Address to the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, May 4, 1933.’
The only danger is that having learned the lesson, we may forget it. Human
nature is such a funny thing. We learn something today, it is impressed upon
us, and in a few short years we seem toforget all about it and go along and
make the same misiakes over again.
—Francis M. La~•v(1934), p. 41.
p
A. HE ONGOING PROLIFERATION of bank and
thrift failures is the foremost current issue for
financial regulators. Failures of federally insured
banks and thrifts numbered in the thousands
during the 1980s. The problem is especially im-
portant for public policy, because of the poten-
tial liability of the federal taxpayer. For example,
by 1989, the Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation (FSLIC) was so deeply overex-
tended—on the order of $200 billion—that only
the U. S. Treasury could fund its shortfall. The
significance of insurance is seen elsewhere as
well: economists are quick to point to flat-rate
deposit insurance as a factor in causing the high
failure rates. Flat-rate deposit insurance is said
to create a moral hazard: if no one charges
‘Quoted by Sen. Murphy (D.IA) in Congressional Record
(1933), p. 3008.52
bankers a higher rate for assuming risk, then
bankers will exploit the risk-return trade-off to
invest in a riskier portfolio.
Why, then, do we have taxpayer-backed, flat-
rate deposit insurance?’ A simple answer would
be that the legislators who adopted federal de.
posit insurance in 1933 did not understand the
economic incentives involved. This simple answer
seems wrong, however, it has been pointed out
that certain observers articulated the problems
with deposit insurance quite clearly in 1933. In
this view, the fault lies with the policymakers of
1933, who failed to heed those warnings.
This fails to answer why policymakers would
ignore these arguments. Moreover, it does not
explain why it should have taken almost 50
years for the flaws in deposit insurance to take
effect. This paper examines the deposit insur-
ance debate of 1933, first to see precisely what
the issues and arguments were at the time and,
secondarily, to see how those issues were treat-
ed in the legislation. Briefly, I conclude that the
legislators of 1933 both understood the difficul-
ties with deposit insurance and incorpot-ated in
the legislation numerous provisions designed to
mitigate those problems.
The Banking Act of 1933 separated commercial
and investment banking, limited bank securities
activities, expanded the branching privileges of
Federal Reserve member banks, authorized fed-
eral regulators to remove the officers and direc-
tors of member banks, regulated the payment
of interest on deposits, arid increased minimum
capital requirements for new national banks,
among numerous lesser provisions. It also estab-
lished a temporary deposit insurance plan lasting
from January 1 to July 1, 1934, and a perma-
nent plan that was to have started on July 1,
1934.’ Although this paper focuses on deposit
insurance, it is important to bear in mind that
both the deposit insurance provisions of the bill
and the debate that surrounded them each had
a larger context. The various provisions of the
Banking Act of 1933 constituted an interdepen-
dent package.
The deposit guaranty provisions of the bill
were initially opposed by President Roosevelt,
Carter Glass (Senate sponsor of the bill and Con-
gress’s elder statesman on banking issues), Trea-
sury Secretary Woodin, the American Bankers
Association (ABA), and the Association of Re-
serve City Bankers, among others.~Despite this
opposition, on June 13, 1933, the bill passed
virtually unanimously in the Senate, with six
dissents in the Rouse, and was signed into law
by the President on June 16.’ Not surprisingly
then, the public debate preceding and surround-
ing the adoption of federal deposit insurance
was active and far-reaching.
This paper is organized around the major
themes of the debate: the actuarial questions
concerning the effects of deposit insurance, the
philosophical and practical questions of fairness
to depositors and of depositor protection as an
expedient means to financial stability, and the
political and legal questions surrounding bank
chartering and supervision. Much of the debate
2The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has re-
cently announced a move toward risk-adjustment of its in-
surance premia.
3The Act is often called the Glass-Steagall Act. It is
referred to here as the Banking Act of 1933 to avoid con-
fusion with the separate Glass-Steagall Act of 1932. Sig-
nificantly, it also has the longer official title: “An Act to
provide for the safer and more effective use of the assets
of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent the un-
due diversion of funds into speculative operations, and for
other purposes.”
The temporary plan was later extended, and the perma-
nent plan delayed, for one year (to July 1, 1935) by the
Act of June 16, 1934. The Banking Act of 1935 substantial-
ly emended the permanent plan to resemble closely the
temporary plan. See the shaded insert on page 72 for fur-
ther details of the various plans.
4The Federal Reserve did not adopt an official position,
although there is some evidence of opposition: “Deposit
guaranty by mutual insurance is not part of the Presiden-
tial program, nor is it favored by Federal Reserve authori-
ties,” “Permanent Bank Reform” (1933); see also Kennedy
(1973), pp. 217-18. Comptroller O’Connor favored deposit
insurance; tormer Comptroller Pole opposed it.
5The Senate did not record a vote, although even Sen.
Huey Long (D-LA), who had been a flamboyant detractor,
rose to speak in favor of the bill. Cummings (1933) claims
that the Senate vote was unanimous. The House dis-
senters included Reps. McFadden (R-PA), McGugin (R-
KS), Beck (R-PA) and Kvale (Farmer/Labor-MN). See
“Congress Passes and President Roosevelt Signs Glass-
Steagall Bank Bill as Agreed on in Conference” (1933), p.
4192. Rep. McGugin’s request for a division revealed 191
ayes and 6 noes; a quorum of 237 was reported present;
Congressional Record (1933), p. 5898.55
was motivated by economic and political self-
interest and was structured rhetorically in
terms of morality and justice. Considerable at-
tention is paid here to rhetorical detail.” As
much as possible, I have attempted to report
the debate in its own terms—liberal use is made
of quotations and epigraphs—rather than risk
misconstruing the meaning through inaccurate
paraphrase.
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The banking debate in 1933 covered not only
deposit insurance and the separation of com-
mercial and investment banking, but the full
catalogue of financial matters: the gold stan-
dard, inflation, monetary policy and the contrac-
tion of bank credit, interstate branching, the
relative merits of federal and state charters,
holding company regulation, etc. By 1933, nearly
anything to do with banks or banking was an
important political issue.
T’h.r.~Grs~~.a.t (]o.n.t;rar.I~1ic’n
The people know that the Federal Reserve octopus
/oaned .. to the gamblers of this Nation in 1928
some sisty billion dollars of credit money—bank
money—hot air ... and then when the crisis came
in the last 3 months of 1929, cut that credit
money—bank money—hot air—down to thirteen
billion.
No nation, no industry, can survive such an
espansion and contraction of money and credit.
Give to me the power to double the money at
will, and then give me the power to cut it square
in two at will, and I can keep you in bondage.~
It is reasonable to begin a recollection of the
debate over deposit insurance with the price
collapse on the New York Stock Exchange of
October 29, 1929. The stock market crash was
popularly recognized as the start of the Great
Depression. The remainder of the Hoover ad-
ministration’s tenure witnessed historic declines
in national economic activity. By the beginning
of 1933, industrial production and nominal GNP
had both been cut in half; unemployment had
topped 24 percent. Bank failure rates, which
had already been high throughout the 1920s,
had increased fourfold, while both money sup-
ply and velocity had plummeted. The price level
fell accordingly.
For contemporary economic commentators,
the stock market crash was more than a mar-
ker between historical eras. For many, there
was a causal relationship between the stock
market’s collapse and subsequent real economic
activity. in most cases, this causality was more
elaborate than post hoc ergo propter hoc. A pre-
scient Paul Warburg, for example, warned in
March 1929:
Iforgies of unrestrained speculation are per-
mitted to spread too far, however, the ultimate
collapse is certain not only to affect the specu-
lators themselves, but also to bring about a gen-
eral depression involving the entire country.’
The logic was that stock market speculation “ab-
sorbs so much of the nation’s credit supply that
it threatens to cripple the country’s regular bus-
iness.”9 A more radical theory was advanced by
the “liquidationists,” who held sway in influen-
tial circles of government and the academy.’°
For them, the cyclical contraction was a good
thing: it reflected the liquidation of unsuccess-
ful investments that crept in during the boom
years, thus freeing economic resources for a
more efficient redeployment elsewhere.
~Most of what remains of the debate is formalized oratory:
prepared speeches, Congressional debate, letters to the
editor, etc. Because the debate was a cacophony of
voices, rather than an orderly dialogue, no attempt has
been made to present the arguments in chronological ord-
er. A time line of the significant events of 1933 is provided
in the shaded insert on page 55.
In terms of the written record, academic economists en-
tered the debate late, for the most part after the Banking
Act of 1933 had already been signed into law. See H.
Preston (1933), Westerfield (1933), Willis (1934), Willis and
Chapman (1934), Taggart and Jennings (1934), Fox (1936)
and Jones (1938). Phillips (1992) reports that Frank Knight
and several colleagues at the University of Chicago advo-
cated federal guaranty of deposits as part of comprehen-
sive bank reforms proposed during the banking crisis in
March 1933. Willis had been an advisor to Carter Glass
since the debate over the Federal Reserve Act in 1912.
Guy Emerson, who published in the Quarterly Journal of
Economics, was not an academician, but an officer at
Bankers Trust Co. and the 1930 president of the Associa-
tion of Reserve City Bankers; Emerson (1934) is largely a
paraphrase of Association of Reserve City Bankers (1933),
which he co-authored.
7Rep. Lemke (R-ND), Congressional Record (1933),
p. 3908.
8Warburg (1929), p. 569.
‘Ibid., p. 571.
‘°DeLong (1990) provides a valuable review of the liquida-
tionist perspective. The Iiquidationists included Secretary
of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, as well as the economists
Friedrich von Hayek, Lionel Robbins, Seymour Harris and
Joseph Schumpeter. More recent economic analyses have
discounted the role of the crash in causing the Depres-
sion, emphasizing instead other forces, both monetary and
non-monetary; see Wheelock (1992a) and the references
therein.Crisis and ljnihniied Pnssihih’iv to induce our people to follow theii- false lead-
We are confused. We grasp, as at straws, for the
significance of events and of proposed govern-
ment action. Never before in our lives have we
had such great needfor someone to interpret tin-
deriving movements for our guidance.”
By 1933, the correlation between economic ac-
tivity and bank credit was lost on no one. Dur-
ing the interregnum between Floover’s electoral
loss in November 1932 and Roosevelt’s inaugura-
tion in March 1933, what had been a debilitat-
ing banking malaise became a desperate crisis.
Starting with Michigan, on Valentine’s Day,
whole states began to declare official hank holi-
days; elsewhere, individual banks in scores were
suspending withdrawals. By inauguration day,
March 4, most states had declared a holiday.”
Even much earlier, bank failures had left whole
towns without normal payment services, rele-
gating them to barter.”
Theories of the connection hetween hank
failures, monetary contraction and the more
general macroeconomic torpidity were wide-
spread and varied. Roosevelt, in his inaugural
address, suggested that the set of people who
correctly understood the nation’s economic prob-
blems did not overlap with the set of people
who had held the reins:
Their effoits have been cast in the pattern of
an outworn tradition. Faced by failure of credit
they have proposed only the lending of more
money. Stripped of the lure of profit by which
ership, they have resorted to exhortations,
pleading tearfully for restored confidence. They
know only the rules of a generation of self-
seekers, They have no vision, and when there
is no vision the people perish.
To some extent, such a suggestion was accurate;
Treasury Secretary Mellon and the liquidation-
ists had initially refused even to admit that there
was a problem.
Some proposed that complex intrigues were at
work to sap the nation’s wealth. Rep. Leinke
(see the quote referenced in footnote 7), for ex-
ample, advanced a monetarist thesis that both
the boom of 1929 and the Depression were the
intentional result of Federal Resetve policy.
More conspiratorial still was Rep. McFadden’s
belief, advanced on the House floor, that
“money Jews” lay behind the banking crisis.”
Rep. Weidenian, offering the metaphor that “the
most dangerous beasts in the jungle make the
softest approach,” claimed that “international
money lenders” had duped the Congress into
creating a system for skimming hank gold
reserves into a central pool “to feed the maw of
international speculation.””
Alarm generated by the crisis and frustration
at the lack of a remedy combined to expand the
political horizons. Radical solutions were sug-
gested. Informed by the political experiments
under way elsewhere, relatively sober proposals
were submitted to scrap the inefficient bureau-
cracies of representative democracy in favor of
a fascist dictatorship or state socialism.” More
“Love (1932), p. 25.
“Before deposit insurance, banks in financial trouble were
generally treated like any other business. Closure might
be declared by supervisors or the directors of the bank.
One option was then to seek protection from depositors
and other creditors by declaring bankruptcy and accepting
a court-appointed receivership. In the case of a temporary
liquidity problem, a bank might instead suspend withdraw-
als or close to the public until the problem could be
resolved. In practice, the terms “failure” and “suspen-
sion” were often used interchangeably. In the period
1921-32, roughly 85 percent of failed banks—holding 76
percent of the deposits in failed banks—were state banks
(including mutual savings banks and private banks). See
Bremer (1935), especially footnote 1 and pp. 41-49.
See Federal Reserve Board (1934a), Colt and Keith
(1933) or Friedman and Schwartz (1963) for a chronology
of the banking crisis and the bank holidays. In a sense,
Roosevelt had stage-managed the crisis. By refusing to
participate with the outgoing administration over the bank-
ing situation, he prolected the image of making a clean
break with the past. At the same time, however, the result-
ing uncertainty surrounding his policy toward banking and
the gold standard helped to provoke the crisis. See
Kennedy (1973), pp. 135-55, or Burns (1974), pp. 31-51.
‘4Roosevelt (1938), p. 12.
“McFadden lost his House seat over the incident. Scandal-
ized by his comments, the Republican and Democratic
parties. both of which had endorsed him in 1932, repudiat-
ed him in the 1934 elections. See Martin (1990), p. 249,
and Rep. McFadden (R-PA), CongressionalRecord (1933),
pp. 6225-27.
‘“Rep. Weideman (D-Ml), Congressiona/ Record (1933),
pp. 3921-22. Weideman, in a conspiracy theory shared by
the radio priest, Fr. Coughlin [see Chernow (1990). pp.
381.82], also claimed that the Great War had been or-
chestrated by international financiers, noting: “Six months
after the Federal Reserve Act was passed the war began.”
“See, for example, Ogg (1932), Calverton (1933) and
Schlesinger (1960). Indeed, for many, the New Deal was
state socialism. One must bear in mind that 1933 predat-
ed most of the failures and atrocities of the various Euro-
pean dictatorships. Although the collectivization of Soviet
agriculture was largely complete, Stalin’s great political
purges did not begin until the mid-1930s. Mussolini was
still widely respected as the man who had brought order
and unity to Italy; the invasion of Abyssinia was not until
1935. In Germany, Hitler was only beginning to wrest con-
trol from the notoriously ineffectual Weimar republic: he
became Chancellor in late January 1933, and the Nazis
burned the Reichstag four weeks later. “See “What’ll We Use for Money?” (1933).A Chronology
1/10/33 Sen Huey Long’s filibuster of the Glass legi lation begins
1/21/33 Senate filibuster ends.
1/30/33 Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany
2/20/33 Prohibition repealed
3/4/33 Franklin D Roosex elt is inaugurated 72nd (ongres 2nd ses ion ends
Senate of the 73rd Congress convenes tn special session.
3/6/33 President Rooset cIt declares a nation-wide bank holiday las ing nine days.
3/9/33 Congress convenes tn extr ordinary session (first session of the 73rd Congress)
The Emergency Banking Act is inti oduced passed and signed in o law.
5’15/33 Carter Gla, mt odu es 5 631
5/17/33 Henry Steagall introduces H II. aGGl
5/19/33 Arthur Vandenberg introduces an amendment to the Glass bill.
5,23/33 House pass~.sSteagail bill.
5/26/33 Senate passes Glass Vandenberg bill
5,2/33 The Securities Act of 1933 signed
6/12/33 World Monetary and Economic Conference opens in London.
6/13/33 Conference committee submits a conference report on the Banking Act to Congress
Banking Act of 1933 is approved by Congress
6/16/33 President Roosevelt signs the Banking Act of 1933
First session of the 73 d Congress adjourns
9/4/33 ABA Contention begins in Chicago (ends 9/7/33)
9/17/33 ABA President Frank Sisson dies
1/1/34 Federal Deposit Insurance Coiporation is chartered
Temporary deposit insurance begins.
popular n as a flirtation with goternment by Ihe measure of the restoration lie5 in the extent
‘technocracy,” a small panel or cabinet of cx- to which we apply sor ial values more nob/e than
ports to replace the congressional and executit e mere monetarj profit.’
branches. Relative to alternatives such as these
federal deposit insurance which had failed in Both proponents and opponents of the deposit
Congress more than 150 times in the preceding goatanty features of the Banking Act took the
50 yeais tt as a remarkably moderate option. l8 rhetorical high ground in arguing their point.
indeed, recourse to moi ality in public debate
n as widespread. The ‘noble experiment’ with
The mone changers have fledfrom their high the prohibition of liquor it as still an issue in the
seats in the temple of our chilization. We may 1932 election.’°Oratory was laden with biblical
now restore that temple to the ancient tt’uths. imagery. Sen. ~andenherg (H-MI) referred to
‘85ee FDIC (1951) and Paton (1932) Paton also cites H R 20Prohibition was widely recognized as having failed by this
7806, introduced by Rep. Cable (R-OH) on January 15, time- see Kent (1932) p 261. The Eighteenth Amendment
1932, and later revised as HR10201. H. R. 7806 is omit was repealed in 193~
ted from the FDIC (1951) digest.
“Roosevelt (1938), p. 12.56
“B. C. days—which is to say, Before the Crash.
“i A. C. Robinson saw fit to lecture sub-
scribers to the ABA Journal on the “Moral
Values of Thrift)” advising bankers of the need
for “an unshake-
able conviction of these ideals [truth and morali-
ty] and their ultimate triumph. ‘if thou faint in
the day of adversity, thy strength is small.’ “22
For many, the Depression represented an
atonement for the excesses of the bull market.
By all accounts, 1929 was characterized by stock
market speculation.23 As the extent of the ava-
rice became clear with hindsight, the notion of
economic depression as punishment for econom-
ic transgression took hold:
We are passing through chastening experiences,
as severe for the banker as for anyone else,
many of the illusions have disappeared and the
trappings of a meretricious prosperity have
been stripped from most persons.”
The notion of recession as a necessary purga-
tive unfortunately extended to policymakers as
well. Mellon’s advice to Hoover exposes the pi-
ous foundations to the liquidationist view of the
Depression:
It will purge the rottenness out of the system.
High costs of living and high living will come
down. People will work harder, live a more
moral life. Values will he adjusted, and enter-
prising people will pick up the wrecks from
less conipetent people.”
‘This fluency with righteousness revealed itself
on all sides of the deposit insurance debate.
Both proponents and detractors of the deposit
guaranty provisions of the Banking Act argued
that their position was ultimately a matter of
simple justice, which dare not be denied. The
bankers declared that well-managed banks
should not be forced to subsidize poorly run
banks. Supporters of the legislation maintained
that depositors should not have to bear the loss-
es accruing to their bankers’ mistakes. Those
who felt that deposit insurance was a ploy to
destroy the dual banking system painted a pic-
ture of the unit bank as the pillar of the na-
tional economy, untainted by corruption. ‘The
remainder of the paper is organized around
these three loosely defined constituencies.
[.i1’FITXUL/i.’..IES
Opposition to deposit insurance can be roughly
organized into two classes: objections on technical
actuarial grounds, and objections to its anticipated
impact on bank structure. The core constituency
in the former category consisted of the money-
center banks, with ABA President Francis Sisson,
himself a Wall Street banker, taking the lead.’”
The economic motivation for their opposition was
the belief that insurance meant a net transfer
from big banks, where the bulk of deposits lay, to
state-chartered unit banks, where they expected
the bulk of the losses.
nsur’a.rp.cc’ arid G;wn’anti’es
In the law as written the guaranty plan is
referred to not as a guaranty of bank deposits,
but as an insurance p/an. There is nothing in this
plan that entitles it to be classed as insurance.”
1 think you gentlemen are all wrong to call this a
guarantee of deposits. There is not a thing in the
bill that talks about guarantee. It is an insurance
of deposits.”
The actuarial correctness of the term “deposit
insurance” as a description of the proposed legis-
lation was a point of contention. The alternative
label, offered by opponents, was “deposit guaran-
ty.” One’s choice of terms usually revealed where
2’Vandenberg (1933): p. 39.
‘2Robinson (1931), p. 209.
23”Orgy of speculation” was the catch phrase that captured
the popular sentiment. For example, “Our Orgy of Specu-
lation” (1929), p. 907, quotes Chancellor of the Exchequer
Philip Snowden: “There has been a perfect orgy of specu-
lation in New York during the last twelve months?’
‘“Robinson (1931), p. 209.
“Hoover, quoted in De Long (1990), p. 5. Bankers Magazine
offered it as a modern paradox, “that depressions are
sent by heaven for the chastening of mankind?’ See
“Modern Paradoxes” (1933). The liquidationists drew a
sardonic retort from Keynes, who identified it as sanctimony
masquerading as economics: “It would, they feel, be a
victory for the mammon of unrighteousness if so much
prosperity was not subsequently balanced by universal
bankruptcy.” See Keynes (1973), p. 349.
Mellon’s advice also offers an example of a common
tendency to anthropomorphize the economy, in this case
as a system to be purged. For a more extreme example,
see Taussig (1932), who draws an elaborate analogy be-
tween physicians and economists.
‘“The ABA (1933a) dissected the failure of the various state
insurance schemes. The Association of Reserve City
Bankers (1933) published a monograph late in the debate
outlining the actuarial objections to deposit insurance.
27Association of Reserve City Bankers (1933), p. 27.
28C. F. Dabelstein, in ABA (1933b), p. 58. For similar re-
marks, see Rep. Beedy (R-ME), Congressional Record
(1933), p. 3911; Sen. Glass (D-VA), ibid., p. 3726-27; and
Donald Despain, quoted by Sen. Schall (R-MN), ibid.,
p. 4632.one stood on the issue, and the semantic con-
troversy became a microcosm of the actuarial
issues involved.” By labeling the various schemes
as plans to “guaranty” deposits, opponents were
able to associate the plans immediately with the
infelicitous recent experience with state deposit
guaranty schemes (discussed in the next subsec-
tion). The natural response for supporters was
to insist on a different label.
Both proponents and opponents devoted ener-
gy to identifying the desirable “insurance princi-
ple,” which then either accurately described or
failed to describe the proposed legislation.’” Like
blind men describing an elephant, however, few
agreed on a definition for the insurance princi-
ple. This was so, despite Rep. Steagall’s claim
that the principle of insurance was “the most
universally accepted principle known to the
business life of the world.”
Deposit insurance was clearly similar in many
respects to other types of insurance, which had
been in vvidespread use in the United States for
decades. Even the most ardent detractor recog-
nized some resemblance:
The general argument employed to promrne the
guaranty plan began with the premises that
property can be insured and bank deposits are
property. It travelled to the broad assumptions
that the principle of the distribution of risk
through insurance could he applied to bank
deposits.”
The salient principles here, espoused repeatedly
by supporters of the legislation, were the diver-
sification of risk and the diffusion of losses. in
this respect, a national plan would differ from
the state plans, which had “violated the primary
insurance tenet that risks must be decentralized
and sufficiently spread so as to avoid concen-
trated losses.”
For others, the distinction between govern-
ment and private backing defined the difference
betiveen insurance and guaranty. Both Sen.
Glass and Rep. Steagall were adamant that cov-
erage be provided privately, not by the
government:
This is not a Government guaranty of deposits.
The Government is only involved in an initial
subscription to the capital of a corporation
that we think will pay a dividend to the Gov-
ernment on its investmenL It is not a Govern-
ment guaranty.”
I do not mean to he understood as favoring
Government guaranty of bank deposits. 1 do
not. I have never favored such a plan. -
Bankers should insure their own deposits.”
‘I’he argument against government backing was
outlined by Sen. Bulkley.’”
An insurance feature included in both the
Steagall and Glass bills and in Sen. Vandenberg’s
temporary insurance amendment to the Glass
bill was a provision for depositor co-insurance.”
The Glass and Steagall bills called for a progres-
sive depositor copayment schedule: the first
$10,000 would be covered in full, the next
$40,000 would be covered at 75 percent, and
only 50 percent of amounts over $50,000 would
be covered; the Vandenberg amendment set a
single coverage ceiling at $2,500. Some propo-
‘“The FDIC (1951), p. 69, provides a clear distinction be-
tween insurance and guaranty. By their definition, a
guaranty is a promise from the U. S. government to pay
off depositors in a failed bank; insurance is paid from an
independent private fund. There was no agreed definition
for insurance or guaranty in 1933, however, although the
explicit acknowledgement that “no clear distinction [be-
tween the terms ‘guaranty’ and ‘insurance] has been
made,” was rare; see Rep. Bacon (R-NY). Congress/ona/
Record (1933), p. 3959. W. B. Hughes also attempted to
extricate the “inexcusable mixture of the two terms
Guarantee is where you make the good bank pay for the
poor one. Insurance is where you make those who get the
benefit pay for it?’ See ABA (1933b) p. 59. I use the two
terms interchangeably in this article.
“In fact there were numerous conflicting legislative
proposals afoot. That of Henry Steagall, who chaired the
House Banking Committee, was taken most seriously; it
eventually became law. See FDIC (1951) and Paton (1932).
“Congressional Record (1933), p. 3836.
“ABA (1933a), p. 7.
“Sen. Vandenberg, Congressiona/ Record (1933), p. 4239.
“Sen. Glass, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3729. See
also footnote 28.
“Rep. Steagall, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3838.
‘“See the quote referenced by footnote 1. Similar concerns
were voiced by Jamison (1933), p. 451: “The great urgen-
cy for balancing the national budget precludes even the
thought of piling another subsidy on the shoulders of the
already overburdened taxpayers.”
These sentiments are especially noteworthy in light of
recent attempts to paint the insurance schemes as having
taxpayer backing from the start. For example, Title IX of
the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 states that
Congress “should reaffirm that deposits up to the statutori-
ly prescribed amount in federally insured depository insti-
tutions are backed by the full faith and credit of the
United States;” (emphasis added).
“Co-insurance is the insurance practice of involving the in-
sured party in some portion of the risk. Common tech-
niques of co-insurance are coverage ceilings, deductibles
and copayment percentages. The aim of such provisions
is to mitigate the problem of moral hazard or the tendency
of people to behave more riskily when insured.
JtJt,Y/A’,JCjLiST 1992nents saw no need for such mitigating features.
Rep. Dingell (D-MI), for example, offered bankers
no quarter; his idea was “to guarantee every
dollar put in by the depositor from now on and
to make the banker and the borrower pay the
cost.” For Sen. Vandenberg, on the other hand,
co-insurance was crucial; he complained angrily
when Treasury Secretary Woodin proposed “not
a limited insurance such as is included in the
amendment which the Senate adopted, but a
complete 100% guarantee.”
Opponents in the banking industry were un-
impressed by such arguments. Although all of
the proposals achieved a spreading of losses and
many had other familiar features of insurance,
such as co-insurance or provision for a large
reserve fund, they still were not “insurance.”
Francis Sisson was obstinate: “Detailed and tech-
nical differences in this bill as compared with
former guaranty schemes do not differentiate it
in essential principle from them “41 For all their
trouble, crafters of the legislation had failed to
meet the bankers’ standard for insurance, the
principle of selected risks:
Insurance involves an old and tried principle.
The essence of insurance is the payment by the
insured of premiums in actt,arial relation to the
risk involved. Under the terms of the perma-
nent plan, however, the costs or premiums are
not charged according to the risk.~’
Roosevelt made a similar connection. In his first
presidential press conference, he asserted:
I can tell you as to guaranteeing bank deposits
my own views, and I think those of the old Ad-
ministration. The general underlying thought
behind the use of the word ‘guarantee’ with
respect to bank deposits is that you guarantee
bad banks as well as good banks. The minute
the Government starts to do that the Govern-
ment runs into a probable loss.~’
Although he associates the “guaranty” terminol-
ogy with government backing, its defining char-
acteristic is clearly the absence of selected risks.
Despite the attention given to selected risks in
the debate, no significant attempt appears to
have been made to include a risk-based premi-
um in legislation. Emerson, for one, thought
such an arrangement could work.’” The ABA,
on the other hand, thought it impossible:
The apparently unsurmountable actuarial
difficulty in the guaranty plan appears to be
the impossibility of placing it on the basis of
selected risks;
the risks involved were “wholly unpredictable,”
and banks were subject to “internal deteriora-
tion” when their deposits were guaranteed.”
ills!rrrr’ a.nd Gr.rrzauisv
As to the history of the guaranty plan, a wa-ce of
guaranty of state bank deposits laws swept over
the seven contiguous western states of Oklahoma,
Kansas, Tecas, Nebraska, Mississippi, South
Dakota and North Dakota and the Pacific Coast
state of Washington in the period 1908-1 7.
The laws establishing it were repealed or allowed
“Congress/onal Record (1933), p. 489. More thoughtful com-
mentators realized that the incidence of the cost could not
be contained. Rep. Kloeb (D-OH), ibid., p. 489, challenged
Rep. Dingell immediately: “Assuming that an assessment
is made upon the bankers, how are we going to prevent
that from sifting down to the depositors?” Similarly, Jami-
son (1933), p. 454, explained that, “while the banks would
remit the premiums;’ they would also adjust their interest
rates, so that, “in the end the banks’ customers would pay
the premiums?’
“Quoted in “Congress Passes and President Roosevelt
Signs Glass-Steagall Bank Bill as Agreed on in Confer-
ence” (1933), p. 4193. The proposal itself is surprising,
given Woodin’s strong oblections to deposit insurance.
Many others shared Vandenberg’s view; see, for example,
Sen. Glass, Congressiona/ Record (1933), p. 3728; Sen.
Bulkley (quoted by Sen. Murphy), ibid., p. 3007.
“‘There was disagreement about the reserve fund even af-
ter the legislation had been signed. The Association of
Reserve City Bankers (1933), p. 28, asserted baldly that
“no provision is made for building up a reserve fund as
would be the case under a true insurance plan;’ while
Sen. Vandenberg (1933), p. 39, contended that the plan
was “capitalized with truly prodigal reserves” (any irony in
his use of the adjective “prodigal” is doubtless unintend-
ed). The discrepancy lies in the fact that, unlike Van-
denberg, the Association of Reserve City Bankers did not
treat the FDIC’s capital as an insurance reserve fund.
“Sisson (1933b), p. 31.
“Association of Reserve City Bankers (1933), p. 27, (empha-
sis in the original). “Selecting risks” refers to the practice
of differentiating insured parties according to risk and
charging insurance premia according to those risk class-
es. For example, 17-year-old men on average pose a great-
er risk to auto insurers than do 30-year-old men; therefore,
17-year-olds usually pay higher auto insurance premia.
“Roosevelt (1938), p. 37.
““Emerson (1934), p. 244, states, “To put such a provision
[assessments levied according to risk] into effect would re-
quire the classification of the banks of the country accord-
ing to various standards: geographical location, size, type,
and character of banking policy. The last would present
administrative difficulties, but these would not be insuper-
able?’ Bankers Magazine had also thought it feasible:
“Presumably, an insurance company could be formed
which by carefully selecting its risks, might operate suc-
cessfully?’ See “Protecting Bank Depositors” (1931), p. 435.
“‘ABA (1933a), pp. 42-43. Similarly, Jamison (1933), p. 454,
argued that selection of risks in this context would present
“complications that can not be easily overcome.”to become inoperative as one after another of the
plans becamefinancially insolvent and was recog-
nized as serving to make banking matters
worse.4”
As in the case of branch banking, Nation-wide
diversification of insurance risks would secure
banking against any eventuality except such a tma-
tional calamity as would destroy the Government
itself.”
The “guaranty” terminology connoted the
defunct state deposit guaranty plans, a specter
that terrorized the bankers. The mere mention
of deposit guaranties could induce a banker to
show “every sign of incipient apoplexy.””’ At the
same time, the unvarying failure of the state
plans provided a trove of evidence for foes of
the federal scheme.” Release of the ABA report
coincided with the introduction of the Glass and
Steagall bills in Congress. It found perverse
delight in the failure of all eight of the state
plans:
Eight large scale tests, by practical working ex-
perience, of the guaranty of bank deposits plan
as a means for strengthening banking condi-
tions and safeguarding the public interest are a
matter of record. Each one of these attempts
failed of its purpose.
Taken separately, special circumstances such
as technical defects in the plan or faulty ad-
ministration might be held accountable for the
breakdown in any given instance, leaving it an
open question as to whether the idea might not
be successful under different circumstances.
Taken as a composite whole, however, the
failures of the various plans not only confirm
one another in their defects, but each one also
supplies added special features that were tested
and found wanting.’”
This unbroken string of failures demanded an
explanation from supporters of federal legisla-
tion. Proponents chose to distinguish clearly the
ne%v plan from the state schemes: “there is no
logical relationship between these old State
Guarantees and this new Federal Insurance; no
analogy; no parallel; and no reason to confuse
the mortality of the former with the vitality of
the latter.”
To make this case, supporters emphasized
foremost the much broader geographic—and
therefore industrial—diversification of a federal
insurance fund. “The fact that bank-deposit-
guaranty projects have failed in local, restricted
areas only proves one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of insurance, that is, that there must exist
wide and general distribution and diversifica-
tion” In particular, the old plans were said to
have suffered from a “one-crop” problem, that
is, their application in states overwhelmingly de-
pendent upon agriculture:
There is a vast difference between what can be
accomplished by a small number of banks in
one State dependent upon a single crop and
what can be successfully accomplished by the
banking system of this great Nation that holds
the financial leadership of the world in its
hands.”
On this point, at least, the bankers were forced
to concede.”
The bankers revealed the geographic breadth
of the federal plan to be a two-edged sword,
‘“ABA (1933a), p. 7. The seven states listed are not, in fact,
contiguous.
“Rep. Bacon, Congress/ona/ Record (1933), p. 3959.
“‘Stephenson (1934), p. 35. There is a hint of truth in
Stephenson’s hyperbole. Francis Sisson died of heart
failure within a fortnight of the ABA convention of Septem-
ber 1933 — which had included excoriating harangues
[see Bell (1934)] delivered by Jesse Jones of the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation and soon-to-be FDIC board
member J. F T. O’Connor; see “Death of Francis H. Sis-
son, Vice-President Guaranty Trust Co. of New York and
Former President American Bankers Association” (1933),
and O’Connor (1933). In a tribute at the next convention,
Sisson’s ABA colleagues offered that his death was “a
tragic demonstration of devotion to duty even to the extent
of exceeding the physical power of endurance ... He was
a martyr to his work in your behalf?’ Nahm (1934), p. 30.
‘“5everal groups dissected the state plans in the course of
the debate; see American Savings, Building and Loan In-
stitute (1933), ABA (1933a), Blocker (1929), Boeckel (1932),
and the Association of Reserve City Bankers (1933). Refer-
ence was also made to an earlier essay by Robb (1921).
There are also numerous retrospective accounts of the
state guaranty plans, including Calomiris (1989 and 1990),
Wheelock (1992b and 1992c), and Wheelock and Kumb-
haker (1991); the most comprehensive, however, is Warbur-
ton (1959), parts ot which appear in FDIC (1953 and 1957).
The original legislation is collected in Federal Reserve
Board (1925a and 1925b).
“ABA (1933a), p. 7.
“Vandenberg (1933), p. 39, (emphasis in the original).
“Donald Despain, quoted by Sen. Schall, Congressional
Record (1933), pp. 4631-32. Virtually identical arguments
are offered by Vandenberg (1933), p. 39, and Rep. Bacon,
Congressional Record (1933), p. 3959.
“Rep. Steagall, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3838.
““For example, the Association of Reserve City Bankers
(1933), pp. 31-32, acknowledged that, “It is suggested
that a single crop failure could shake the stability of all
the banks in a State. On a national scale the plan would
operate upon a broader base. This is true.”Table 1
Estimated Assessments and Losses by Geographic Division
Percent of assessments in Percent of losses in each
each division to division during 1921-1931
Geographic division total assessment to total losses
New England 7.6% 37%
Middle Atlantic 440 200
North Central 186 21 9
Southern Mountain as sa
Southeastern 2.8 137
Southwestern 43 7.0
Western Grain 80 207
Rocky Mountain 18 45
Pacific Coast 27
United States 1000% 100.0%
however, and used it to fight back. They cx- and the conservative banker pays thefiddler. If
ploited the well-known fact that bank failures the conservative banker protest., the slack one
throughout the 1920s had occurred dispropor- invites him to go to a warmer climate. Soon all
tionately among small, rural banks (see table are dancing and the fiddler, ifpaid at all, must
1).” This information was used to argue that, collectfrom the depositors or from the taxpayers.’”
with insurance premia assessed against deposits, For those who opposed deposit insurance on
the burden of funding federal deposit insur- actuarial grounds, such technicalities were
ance—had it existed during the 1920s—would merely manifestations of a more fundamental is-
have been borne in large measure by the money sue. As a matter of principle, deposit insurance
center banks of the Northeast, where much of was held to be unjust. It involved the forced
the industry’s deposit base lay. i’he benefits of subsidization of poorly managed banks by well
insurance, however—the payments to cover managed institutions; it subsidized the “bad”
losses in failed banks—would have gone south banker at the expense of the “good.” This moral
and west. point provided substantial emotional force. op-
ponents concluded that only good bank manage-
ment could ultimately assure safe and sound
banking.
~7 ,~
Their argument, founded in actuarial theory
For it is to be remembered that the weak banks and the experience of the state plans, proceeded
get the same insurance as the strong ones, and, -. - -
- in two steps. First, by protecting depositors
unhke the situation in other kinds of insurance,
the bad risk pays no more for its insurance than against loss, a deposit guaranty would destroy
the good one. This means competition among discipline; insured depositors would take no in-
banks in slackness in the granting of loans. The terest in the quality of their bank’s manage-
bank with the loose credit policy gets the busi- ment. Recalling the state plans, the guaranty
ness and the hank with the careful, cautious had created “a sense of false security and lack
credit policy loses it. The slack banker dances of discrimination as between good and bad
“The table is reproduced from Association of Reserve City ment guaranty of bank deposits can be but one of two
Bankers (1933), p. 26. See Bremer (1935) and Upham and things — an outright subsidy ... or a plan of insurance?’
Lamke (1934) for analyses of failures in the 1920s. Bradford (1933), p. 538, added: “Such subsidization of
‘“E. W. Kemmerer of Princeton University, speaking to the weak banks by the Government, however, carried out on
Savings Bank Association of Massachusetts on September the basis of taxpayers money, is so monstrous as to be
14, 1933, and quoted in Association of Reserve City almost unthinkable.
Bankers (1933), pp. 40-41. Kemmerer was the economic
advisor to the comission that produced the latter. Similar
thoughts were offered by Jamison (1933), p. 451: “Govern-Ful
money swallowed upin the greatest
bear market of all “imes, the banks
lost every peony.
The ssark reality of these facts de-
mand eternal vigilance in granting
every loan. Particularlyin granting
commercial loans, make sure that
your borrowers are adequately cov-
ered by Fidelity Bond,. You always
insist that your borrowers carry fire
insuranceeo safeguardtheirphysical
assets. Ask for the same protection
against the possible peculations
of their employees. insist ehar your
loans be protected against the frail-
ties of humae cites-c. For an em-







banking.”a7 In many minds, this dichotomy be-
tween good and bad bankers was the central is-
sue.58 Bankers Magazine editorialized that “the
surest ieliance of good banking is to he found
in the men who manage the banks rather than
in the laws governing their operations.”” In
1931, ABA President Rome Stephenson contended
that, a large element in the internal conditions
of the banks that failed was bad management
and that a predominant element in the internal
conditions of the hank that remained sound in
the fare of the same external conditions was
good management.~”
What was needed was to teach “the conception
of scientific banking.”6’
The second step in the logic of opposition was
an objection to the subsidy implicit in a guar-
anty. In the tones of a prudish parent, the ABA
complained that the beneficiaries of state sys-
tems had been the “bankers with easier stan-
dards,” who gained competitive advantages over
those with “sounder but less attractive meth-
ods.””~The subsidy was especially problematic
among those banks “which have little chance of
ultimate success.””’
A bank which does not earn a fair average rate
of return over a period of years not only is un-
able to build up reserves against had times, hut,
in order to improve profits, is under constant
temptation to take risks ‘vhich in the end are
likely to lead to failure.
The tendency of a guaranty plan will he to
nurtut-e these unprofitable units and keep them
going temporarily in the knowledge that upon
failure the losses can be shifted to other banks.e4
Thus, the subsidy was seen to extend beyond
the simple protection of unsound institutions
from the competitive pressures of vigilant depos-
itors. Given their contention that, “no provision
is made for building up a reserve fund,” losses
charged to the insurer by failing banks would
have to he recouped after the fact from the sur-
vivors.° Such a system would necessarily entail
transfers of wealth from surviving to failed
banks.
There was no consensus in Congress on the
importance of discipline; some members pointed
out that life insurance was no incentive for sui-
cide.56 The framers of the Glass and Steagall
bills, however, recognized the validity of the
hankers’ objections and addressed the issue
directly. Both hills, as well as the temporary in-
“ABA (1933a). p. 13.
“The advertisement above depicts an insurer’s characteri-
zation of the bad banker. Coincidentally, President
Roosevelt had been a vice-president for the Fidelity and
Deposit Co. of Maryland after his unsuccessful Vice-
Presidential bid in the 1920 election.
““Federal Guaranty of Bank Deposits” (1932), p. 381.
“°Stephenson(1931), p. 592.
55Ibid., p. 592.
52ABA (1933a), p. 25. More specifically, “greater numbers
than ever of undercapitalized, ill-situated banks, as well as
of persons wholly unfitted as to training, character or
methods to be allowed to conduct banks, were able to
command public trust and patronage and to attract large
deposits to their institutions through high interest rates
and trading on faith in the guaranty plan?’ ABA (1933a), p.
17.
“‘Association of Reserve City Bankers (1933), p. 29.
““Ibid., pp. 19-20.
“‘Ibid., p. 28.
“See, for example, Rep. Luce (R-MA), Congress/ona/
Record (1933), p. 3918. Sens. King (D-UT) and Glass brie-
fly debated the role of immortality in the context of this




T happened this way. He was the
comptroller of a large corpora-
tion in New York City—a director
ofhis local suburban bank— a fond
father—he hadthe esteemoffriends
and business associates alike. To-
day he is serving from three and a
halfto ten years for defrauding five
banks and three brokerage houaea
of $493,000.00.
Wall street proved his Waterloo.
Naturally interested in marketmove-
ments,his interestled him gradually
into heavy speculation. As the mar-
ket went down so did he—deeper
and deeper. Finally, desperate, he
forged stock certificates of his own
companywhich heuaed as collateral
to bolster his personal brokerage
accounts.
Then, one day the axe fell. A check-
up revealed that he had defrauded
five banks sod three brokerage
houses on, of $493,000. With thesurance amendment in the Senate, were careful
to limit coverage. Sen. Vandenberg stated ex-
plicitly the rationale for coverage ceilings:
the State Guarantees involved complete protec-
tion for all banking tesources Federal Insur-
ance, on the other hand, leaves the individual
bank and banker so seriously responsible for
such a preponderance of their resources that
there is no appreciable immunity at all.”~
Sen. Glass noted a second source of discipline
inherent in the plan. Because the banks insured
each other, deposit insurance would “lead to the
severest espionage upon the rotten banks of this
country that we have ever had.””5
Under both the temporary and permanent
plans, the small depositor was to be covered in
full, in recognition of his inability to monitor
bank management adequately:
At present the depositor is at the mercy of his
fellow depositors, over whom he has no con-
trol, and of the management of the bank, about
which he is not usually in a position to be well
informed. The depositor takes the risks, and
the banks take the profits.”
A survey conducted by the Comptroller of the
Currency and the Federal Reserve in May 1933
revealed that the ceiling of $2,500 under the
temporary plan would fully cover 96.5 percent
of depositors and 23.7 percent of total deposits
in member banks.’°
r’ij’s~c;i;tj~.:i..~i:~sI1’t~
While most industry opponents fought the
deposit insurance plan on actuarial grounds,
supporters argued that deposits per se required
protection, to stabilize the medium of exchange
and promote a renewed expansion of bank
credit. More significantly, proponents responded
with an argument of powerful simplicity: the
losses to innocent depositors in a bank failure
were a plain injustice. Given the status of banks
in the political climate of 1933, this was a charge
that the bankers ultimately could not counter.
— ,, ft
The use of bankingfunds for speculation became
a stench in the nostrils of the people.”
There was a strong sense that the banking in-
dustry in the 1920s had functioned as an elabo-
rate network to collect savings at the local level
and funnel them into lending on securities
speculation:
Another cause for many banking collapses was
the domination of smaller banks by their large
metropolitan correspondents, which drained
funds from the country districts for speculative
purposes and loaded up the small bank with
worthless securities.”2
Indeed, this was a primary motivation for those
sections of the Banking Act requiring a separa-
tion of commercial and investment banking.
Similar arguments were brought against pro-
posals for nationwide branch, chain and group
banking.”
A sensitivity to such a possibility was doubt-
less nurtured by the popularity of Ponzi schemes
in the 1920s, including the infamous Florida
land swindIes.”~With such analogies in mind,
banks came to be seen as
merely fueling departments in enterprises run
not by bankers concerned with operating banks
but by promoters whose object was to exploit
the credit resources of the bank.
67Vandenberg (1933), p. 39, (emphasis in the original).
“Sen. Glass, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3728.
“Rep. Bacon, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3959.
“See Federal Reserve Board (1933c), p. 414. The point to
be made was that even the temporary plan succeeded in
fully covering the vast majority of depositors. The survey,
of course, took place before depositors had an incentive to
split larger deposits into multiple accounts to achieve full
deposit insurance coverage.
“‘Rep. Luce, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3914.
“2Rep. Bacon, Congress/onal Record (1933), p. 3952. Comp-
troller Pole was instrumental in dichotomizing the industry
into “two definite types of banking, namely, that carried
on bythe small country bank and that of the large city
bank.” See “Comptroller Pole’s Views on Rural Unit Bank-
ing,’ (1930), p. 468.
“Group banking and chain banking are essentially variants
of the modern bank holding company form of organiza-
tion. Group banking presumed some degree of standardi-
zation among the subsidiary banks in the holding
company, while chain banks were operated as largely in-
dependent franchises within the holding company.
““A Ponzi scheme is a fraudulent investment plan, such as
a chain letter, in which returns to existing investors are
paid directly from the deposits of new investors, with the
director of the scheme skimming the difference. Some of
the Ponzi schemes had been run by Charles Ponzi him-
self. After several jail terms and a stint on the lam, Ponzi
was finally deported to his native Italy in 1934. This was
not his first one-way ticket. In 1903, his family had bought
him a one-way ticket to Boston on the S. S. Vancouver in
a successful bid to get rid of him. See Grodsky (1990).63
The primary evil in our banks for many years
has been the incessant efforts of promoters to
get control of the funds which flow into the
banks. The bank is the depository of the com-
munity’s funds and as such is the basis of the
available credit ofthe community. The promoter-
banker needs nothing so much as access to
these credit pools.”
Such accusations were inevitably tinged with at
least a hint of the conspiratorial.””
In keeping with this theme, the issues were
framed for popular consumption as a morality
play in which the naive depositor is pitted against
the sophisticated banker. The depositor tucks
away the hard-earned wages of his honest labor,
only to be systematically duped by the cunning
intrigues of the banker. At the extreme, some
politicians played the religious card face up:
“We discovered that what we believed to be a
bank system was in fact a respectable racket
and so many connected with it only cheap, petty
loan sharks and Shylocks.” In the end, a provi-
dential government was seen to intercede on
behalf of the depositor, and deposit insurance
was trumpeted as “the shadow of a great rock
in a weary land”8
The notion of the small depositor as an inno-
cent victim had immense popular appeal.
McCutcheon’s 1931 political cartoon celebrating
the blamelessness of the depositor in a failed
bank won the Pulitzer Prize (above right). Such
popularity, of course, was plainly evident to
politicians, who responded by introducing
deposit insurance legislation in Congress. Rep.
Steagall is reported to have told House Speaker
Garner in April 1932, “You know, this fellow
Hoover is going to wake up one day soon and
come in here with a message recommending
guarantee of bank deposits, and as sure as he
does, he’ll be re-elected.”~
selves with the legislation. Sen. Vandenberg, up
for re-election in 1934, was always careful to
call his temporary insurance amendment to the
Banking Act of 1933 “The Vandenberg Amend-
ment.” Rep. Dingell announced: “guaranty of
bank deposits is my baby in Michigan.”5°A peti-
tion circulated in the House in June 1933 to
postpone adjournment indefinitely until a de-
posit insurance bill was made law.”’ Figure 1
“Flynn (1934), pp. 394-96.
“Rep. Steagall, for example, avowed that a “campaign was
turned on urging bankers everywhere to ... employ their
facilities in investment banking, in speculation, in stock
gambling, and in aid of wild and reckless international
high finance.” Congressional Record (1933), p. 3835. The
Seventy-first Congress had formed a Senate Banking and
Currency Subcommittee to investigate the extent to which
the Federal Reserve and National Banking systems had
been co-opted to “finance the carrying of speculative
securities.” Sen. Bulkley, quoted by Sen. Murphy, Con-
gressional Record (1933), p. 3006. See also footnotes IS
and 16 an the related text.
“Rep. Dingell, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3906.
‘“Rep. Hill (D-AL), Congress/ona/ Record (1933), p. 5899.
Hill’s pronouncement was met with a round of applause in
the House.
‘“Timmons (1948), p. 179. Garner responded, ‘You’re right
as rain, Henry, so get to work in a hurry. Report out a
deposit insurance bill and we’ll shove it through:’ The
result was H. R. 11362, which passed the House on
May 27, 1932.
“Rep. Dingell, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3906. It is
noteworthy that both Sen. Vandenberg and Rep. Dingell
were from Michigan, where, on February 14, 1933, William
A. Comstock had become the first governor to declare a
state banking holiday during the crisis; see Colt and Keith
(1933), pp. 6-8. In light of the temporary insurance amend-
ment, any dispassionate observer would have to regard
deposit insurance as Vandenberg’s baby in Michigan.
“15ee H. Preston (1933), p. 589, and Rep. McLeod (R-MI),
Congressional Record (1933), p. 5825.
Rapa,’~aypeetes,,: 8e,,, Maaaass,,,
For obvious reasons, bank failures concentrat-
ed the attention of large numbers of voters, and
Congressmen were anxious to associate them-
a “92It is much more important in principle to
guarantee bank deposits, because the real cir-
culating medium of the country is bank
deposits.”’
Although, as a strictly political matter, deposi-
tor protection was the central motivation
responsible for the progress of deposit insur-
ance in Congress, other forces were at issue.
Chief among these was the role of banking in
the real economy. Regarding bank failures, it
was recognized that causality ran two ways:
just as the general drop in real incomes had
caused loan defaults and thus widespread bank
failures, bank failures and the concomitant re-
striction of bank services had caused real in-
comes to fall. The latter effect was seen to
operate both directly and indirectly.
Bank suspensions and failures could trap
depositors’ wealth for a period of months or
even years until the bank either reopened or its
bankruptcy was resolved. The direct result was
reduced consumption and investment spending
by the affected depositors. In the extreme case,
when a town’s lone bank failed, even the sim-
plest forms of exchange could be hopelessly en-
cumbered:
[The unacceptability of failurel would perhaps
not be so if they were grocery stores or butch-
er shops, where failure would be disastrous to
only a few people at most; but bank failures
paralyze the economic life of whole communi-
ties, not only through the loss of money ac-
cumulations but by the destruction of the
deposit currency which is the principal medium
of exchange in all business activity.”’”
Under such circumstances, some affected re-
gions instituted scrip currencies, wooden coinage
or systematic barter arrangements, the most
elaborate of which was the Emergency Ex-
change Association in New York, headed by
Leland Olds.’””
A depositor’s natural response to these possi-
bilities was to withdraw his funds before failure
occurred. Both bank runs and the hoarding of
currency received considerable attention.”°
Withdrawals for the purpose of safeguarding
one’s wealth were deemed unpatriotic; legisla-
tion was even proposed to outlaw the practice.
Banks had a natural response to the threat of
runs: “Credit was tightened in the desire to re-
main as liquid as possible to meet the emergen-
cies of runs.”” Bankers maintained large cash
reserves rather than lend:
it is estimated that banks now have available
billions of dollars of collateral for use in extend-
ing loans, but the plain fact is that for more
than 3 years bankers have given little thought
to anything except to keep their banks in liquid
condition The fear that grips the minds and
hearts of bankers, keeping ever before them
the nightmare of bank runs, makes it impossi-
ble for them to extend the credits that are in-
dispensable to trade and commerce.’2
This analysis is confirmed by the facts. The ag-
gregate excess reserves of Federal Reserve mem-
ber banks, for example, had ballooned from $42
million in October 1929 to a peak of $584 mil-
lion in January 1933, even though the number
of member banks had fallen from 8,616 to
6,816 over roughly the same period.”’ Thus,
bank failures were seen to have an indirect ef-
fect on output, as both depositors and bankers
in solvent institutions prepared for the possibili-
ty of runs and failures.
In the final analysis, depositor protection and
stabilization of the medium of exchange were
recognized as opposite sides of the same coin:
We may talk about percentage of gold back of
our currency, we may discuss technical provi-
sions of legislation ... The public does not un-
derstand these technical discussions, but from
one end of this land to the other the people un-
derstand what we mean by guaranty of bank
deposits; and they demand of you and me that
we provide a banking system worthy of this
great Nation and banks in which citizens may
place the fruits of their toil and know that a
“‘Fisher (1932), p. 143.
““Greer (1933b), p. 538.
““See “What’ll We Use for Money?” (1933).
““See lves (1931) for colorful accounts of depositor runs and
the various responses of bankers. Rep. Bacon, Congres-
sional Record (1933), p. 3959, estimated hoarding at $1.5
billion in January 1933. The extent of hoarding was also
roughly gauged by tracking deposits in the U. S. Postal
Savings system. Such deposits roughly quadrupled in the
two years ending June 30, 1933 [see O’Connor (1933). p.
231. Fr~edmanand Schwartz (1963), p. 173, state that such
deposits remained a “minor factor” in spite of their
growth. The system was established by the Postal Savings
Bill of 1910 and was intended primarily for the savings of
new immigrants. Deposits were guarantied in full. Vice-
President-elect Garner reportedly told Roosevelt, “You’ll
have to have it [deposit insurance], Cap’n, or get more
clerks in the Postal Savings banks1 See Timmons (1948),
p. 179.
“‘Rep. Bacon. Congressional Record (1933), p. 3959.
“2Rep. Steagall, Congressiona/ Record (1933), p. 3840.
“‘Federal Reserve Board (1943), pp. 72-74, 371.deposit slip in return for their hard earnings
will be as safe as a Government bond. [Ap-
plause.]
They know that banks cannot serve the pub-
lic until confidence is restored, until the public
is willing to take money now in hiding and
return it to the banks as a basis for the expan-
sion of bank credit. This is indispensable to the
support of business and the successful financ-
ing of the Treasury. It will bring increased
earnings, higher incomes, and make it possible
to balance the Government’s Budget without
resort to vicious and vexatious methods of taxa-
tion.’”
As such, they should be considered inseparable;
it is clear that supporters of the legislation in-
tended it to achieve both ends. Attempts to rank
the two issues according to their- relative im-
portance are likely to be inconclusive.”’
One banker in my state attempted to marry a
white woman and they lynched him.””
The opposition to federal deposit guaranties
emanated largely from the nation’s bankers.
This fact was a crushing liability to their cause
in the political climate of 1933. The introduction
of the Glass and Steagall bills came on the heels
of the banking panic and, not entirely coin-
cidentally, amid the daily revelations of self-
dealing and other cupidities from the Pecora
hearings.”’ The banker had become a pariah.
““Rep. Steagall, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3840.
“5Golembe (1960) has argued that, among the motives for
deposit insurance, depositor protection was secondary to
protection of the circulating medium. Others have gone
further, arguing that protection of depositors was a ration-
alization created after the fact. The issue raised by
Golembe is certainly plausible; Rep. Bacon, for example,
appears to have ranked them this way [Congressional
Record (1933), p. 3959]. On the other hand, it is notewor-
thy that Sen. Glass in 1933 abandoned his earlier plan for
a liquidation fund, which would have prevented the freez-
ing of funds in suspended banks white still not protecting
depositors from loss. The latter notion of depositor protec-
tion as an ex-post or revisionist justification is clearly
false, however.
““This was a popular quip that made the rounds in 1933. In
this instance, it is attributed to Carter Glass; see Kennedy
(1973), p. 133; Bell (1934), pp. 262-63, also cites it. The
loke is startling in its insensitivity. Examples of bankers of
the day indulging in overtly racist humor are also availa-
ble; see, for example, Dyer (1933), pp. 91 and 94, and Am-
berg (1935), p. 49.
‘“‘The hearings were organized in January 1933 by the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, and were
run by the Committee’s counsel, Ferdinand Pecora; see
Pecora (1939). The dust jacket relates that, in one in-
Roosevelt fired the opening volley for his ad-
ministration in his inaugural address:
Plenty is at our doorstep, hut a generous use of
it languishes in the very sight of the supply.
Primarily this is because the rulers of the ex-
change of mankind’s goods have failed, through
their own stubbornness and their own in-
competence, have admitted their failure, and
abdicated. Practices of the unscrupulous money
changers stand indicted in the court of public
opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of
men.””
He went on to demand safeguards against the
“evils of the old order”: strict supervision of
banking, an end to speculation with “other peo-
ple’s money,” and provision for an adequate but
sound currency.””
Others were happy to follow this lead. it was
commonplace to hold the bankers, and particu-
larly their “speculative orgy” of 1929, responsi-
ble for the nation’s woes:
You brought this country to the greatest panic
in human history~ . There never was such an
economic failure in the history of mankind as
your outfit has brought upon us at this time,
and it is due to this same speculation that you
are defending here more than any other one
thing.
But these affiliates, I repeat, were the most un-
scrupulous contributors, next to the debauch of
the New York Stock Exchange, to the financial
catastrophe which visited this country and was
stance, a journalist “begged Mr. Pecora not to break so
many front-page stories daily because it was physically
impossible to cover them all:’ See Benston (1990) for a
thorough, revisionist view of the hearings.
““Roosevelt (1938), pp. 11-12.
““Roosevelt (1938), p. 13. His reference to “other people’s
money” was a nod to Justice Brandeis’s book of the same
title, a reprint of his articles on the money trust that ap-
peared in Harper’s Weekly in 1913-14. Those who hold that
all the great thoughts have long since been had will be
pleased to learn that Kane’s (1991) reference to the “Sor-
cerer’s Apprentice” segment of Walt Disney’s Fantasia as
a metaphor for bank regulation was anticipated by Bran-
deis. Lacking Mickey Mouse’s rendition, however, Brandeis
was forced to use the German original, Goethe’s Qer
Zauberlehrling; see Brandeis (1933), p. vU.
‘°“Sen.Brookhart (R-IA) speaking to a New York Stock Ex-
change official at a Senate committee hearing in 1932;
quoted by Danielian (1933), p. 496.mainly responsible for the depression under
which we have been suffering since.”
In the previous year, Huey Long had announced
his intent to campaign for Roosevelt under the
slogan: “Rid the country of the millionaires.u202
A popular ditty mocked:
Mellon pulled the whistle,
Hoover rang the bell,
Wall Street gave the signal,
And the country went to hell.”
In short, the bankers were vilified.
Although some felt such indiscriminate abuse
was slanderous, they fought against the tide.b04
One of the casualties of the anti-banker senti-
ment was the bankers’ battle against deposit in-
surance. Some in Congress announced that the
bankers’ opinions should be openly ignored:
I believe that the myopic banker as an adviser
should receive about as much consideration at
the hands of the House as a braying jackass on
the prairies of Missouri. They proved by their
inability to maintain their own business that
they have absolutely no right to advise the
House as to what course we should follow.”
The bankers, while they acknowledged the
merit of individual aspects of the deposit insur-
ance proposals, obstinately refused to coun-
tenance any of the schemes as a realistic
reform. Even as the legislation was signed into
law, Francis Sisson called a crusade, rallying
ABA members to fight “to the last ditch against
the guaranty provisions” of the bill”” That the
bankers’ concerns were not ignored entirely
resulted largely from the presence in govern-
ment of opponents of deposit guaranties who
were more politically astute than the bankers
themselves. Sen. Glass, for example, compro-
mised his principles in a bid for some control
over the legislation, explaining that it was “bet-
ter to deal with the problem in a cautious and a
conservative way than to have ourselves run
over in a stampede.” Roosevelt held out until
the very end, thus forcing Congress to concede
in delaying implementation of the temporary
plan until January 1934.
~~ ~ .n
The ramifications of deposit insurance were
recognized as far-reaching. In many ways, the
central and most contentious battle concerned
neither actuarial feasibility nor the desirability
of protecting deposits, but the regulatory issues
of bank chartering and supervision. Because of
the fundamental legal issues involved, it was
here that the economic and political aspects of
the debate became most fully intertwined. This
was a fight with the weight of a long tradition
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Bank examinations to be effective must be made
by experienced men, free from political influence.
We will never have proper banking supervi-
sion, national or state, until it is taken entirely
awayfrom political influence.’””
Much of the blame for high rates of bank
failure throughout the l9ZOs was placed upon
competition between state and federal authori-
ties. Because banks could choose the less costly
of federal and state charters—and the associated
regulations—state and federal regulators were
forced into a “competition in laxity” if they
were to sustain the realm of their bureaucratic
influence.”” For example, as a prelude to
recommending broader powers for national
banks, Comptroller Pole emphasized that:
If Congress therefore would protect itself from
the loss of its present banking instrumentality,
it must make it to the advantage of capital to
seek the national rather than a [state] trust
company charter.
‘°15en.Glass, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3726. Glass is
referring to the proposed separation of investment affili-
ates from Federal Reserve member banks.
“Kent (1932), p. 260.
“Kennedy (1973), p. 26.
““See, for example, Bell (1934). Sisson (1933b), p. 30,
offered that the treatment of bankers as “demons of dark-
ness” and as an ‘unseen mythical power for evil which
spreads its baneful influence over [human beings]” merely
satisfied an emotional need for a scapegoat.
““Sisson’s telegram is quoted in Pecora (1939), pp. 294-95.
“Sen. Glass, Congressional Record (1933), p. 5862.
““Andrew (1934b), p. 93.
““Daiger (1933), p. 563, attributes coinage of the phrase
“competition in laxity” to Eugene Meyer in 1923 testimony
to the House Banking and Currency Committee. The
phrase attained some popularity; it was also used, for ex-
ample, by Wyatt (1933), p. 186, and AwaIt (1933), p. 4.
““Rep. Dingell, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3906.68
It is within the po\•ver of Congiess to tu,’r~the
advantage in favor of the national banks and
thereby make it to the interest of all banks to
opeiate under tl,e national charter”
In the eyes of opponents of deposit insurance,
an especially important manifestation of the
competition in laxity was the “promiscuous
granting of bank charters.” The immediate
result of loose chartering was a condition called
“over-banking,” or
a host of weak, unreliable banks that crowd
one another- out of existence by being too nu-
n~erouslyorganized in places where there is no
support for the multifarious institutions that
have been established there.”
This “indiscreet indulgence of charter appli-
cants” was held responsible for the vast num-
bers of bank failures throughout the previous
decade:”
There are too many banks in the United States.
The areas of greatest density of banks per capi-
ta coincide with the al-eas whet-c failures are
proportionately highest.””
The function of a deposit guaranty under such
circumstances would be to exacerbate the
problem by mitigating one source of public
scrutiny: inspection by depositors. Opponents
confirmed their contention by reference to the
ill-fated state guaranty schemes:
In practice the guaranty of deposits plan gener-
ally tended to induce an unsound expansion in
the number of banks -- - This was clearly con-
nected with the indiscriminate popular confi-
dence created toward the banks under the
guaranty.”
It is to be feared that the adoptior~of deposit
guaranty laws may have somewhat retarded
the inevitably slow and unsensational process of
strengthening the banking system by strict
regulation, vigilant public opinion and strict i-c-
quirements.””
The Association of Reserve City Bankers went
further, predicting that managers of the insur-
ance fund would be slow to close troubled insti-
tutions.” In addition to regulatory competition,
some saw political influence as a secondary
force debilitating the supervisory process:
We never will have such super-vision under po-
litical regulation and examination: we will never
have arw supervision worthy of tl~ename that
does not have real authority and heavy respon-
sibility tied to it.”
Only a few supporters of insurance addressed
directly the plan’s implications for the regulatory
process, which they presented as a counter-
weight to incentives for bad banking under a
guaranty. Rome Stephenson felt that the addi-
tional regulatory powers in the Banking Act
differentiated the FDIC markedly from the state
plans:
Right there is the crux of the debate: Will
banks under the federal plan be permitted the
abuses which were tolerated in every one of
the states where guaranty was tried? If so, then
failure is inevitable, if not, success is practically
certain.... Let me assert unequivocally that the
men who drew up the federal plan profited by
the mistakes of the state guaranty failures and
avoided then~ None of the state laws had
teeth in tl,em. The federal law has teeti, like a
man-eating shark, and already has done some
highly effective biting.””
Carter (;lass’, x’ailing that “the Comptroller’s
office has not done its duty—its sworn duty—
“Pole (1929), p. 23.
“Association of Reserve City Bankers (1933), p. 30.
112H. Parker Willis, quoted in Lawrence (1930), p. 105.
“Lawrence (1930), p. 104. Lawrence took this priggish tone
one step further, admonishing that “A little birth control of
banks on the part of the states which now suffer most
from bank failures might have had a wholesome effect on
the rate of mortality;” ibid., p. 84.
‘‘4Westerfield (1931), p. 17; the “multiplicity of banks” was
first on his list of the six causes of bank failures since
1920. Andrew (1934b), p. 93, concurred that “Everyone
agrees that one of the main causes of our banking trouble
was too many banks.” See also Bremer (1935). AwaIt
(1933), p. 4, attributes the boom in charters to “lax State
laws” and the 1900 reduction in the minimum capitaliza-
tion for national banks from $50,000 to $25,000.
““ABA (1933a), p. 42. Mississippi was held up as the excep-
tion that proved the rule: “The banking authorities in Mis-
sissippi had full discretion in the matter of granting new
charters and used it liberally in refusing permission
for unneeded banks or to unqualified promoters to open
new institutions;” ibid., p. 22. The result was seen to be
less over-banking and fewer failures relative to Oklahoma
and Nebraska.
““A Saturday Evening Post editorial of August 9, 1924, quot-
ed in Association of Reserve City Bankers (1933),
p. 42.
“See the quote referenced by footnote 64.
““Donald Despain, quoted by Sen. Schall, Congressional
Record (1933), p. 4632.
‘‘“Stephenson (1934), p. 46. In addition to authorizing the
supervisory power of the FDIC, the Banking Act of 1933:
increased the punitive authority of the Federal Reserve for
member banks financing securities “speculation,” prohibit-
ed insider lending for member banks, authorized federal
regulators to remove the officers and directors of member
banks for illegality or unsound banking practice, and re-
quired deposit-taking private banks to submit to supervi-
sion by the Comptroller’s office.and has permitted this great number of banks
to engage in irregular and illicit practices,” ar-
gued that mutual responsibility inherent in the
insurance plan implied mutual supervision: if
the strong banker “knows that he has got to
bear a part of the burden of my irregular bank-
ing, he is going to report me to the Comptroller
of the Currency and is going to insist that his
examiners come there and do their duty.”
Thefact is, of course, that the deposit insurance
scheme would not have been permitted by the
conservative leaders in Congress if its organiza-
tion could not have been so shaped as to further
their idea of a unified system of banking in the
country under the Reserve System. On the other
hand, the more radical elements, in response to
popular demand for some sort of protection for
bank depositors, could not have built a nation-
wide guaranty system upon any other foundation
than the Reserve organization.”
Questions about the effect of insurance on the
quality of chartering and supervision were side-
shows to the main event, however. At the heart
of the debate lay a decades-old controversy over
the dual banking system. Given its far-reaching
nature, the proposed legislation was universally
regarded as a prime opportunity for fundamen-
tal changes in banking policy.
Cotnptroller Pole had campaigned vigorously
throughout his four-year tenure for some form
of interstate branching for national banks. He
drew a strong distinction between the small)
state-chartered, rural unit bank—the “country”
bank—and the large, nationally chartered insti-
tution. While he pretended to maintain great
respect for the small unit bank as the “single
type of institution which has contributed the
most to - -. the foundation of our national de-
velopment,” he was fighting to have them re-
placed by branch networks of national banks.’~’
He justified this split sentiment by arguing that
irreversible social changes—telephone, radio,
and especially the automobile—had forever obvi-
ated the rural isolation that had made the unit
bank competitively viable. Accompanied by a
long parade of statistics, he emphasized the
high failure rate of small, state-chartered banks
during the 1920sJ” The country bank, he said,
could not survive in competition with large
metropolitan institutions, which had more
professional management and were inevitably
better diversified.
Comptroller Pole was not alone in this cru-
sade. The McFadden Act had already broadened
the branching powers of national banks; in
1930, the House Banking Committee arranged
new hearings into the possibility of national or
regional branch banking.”” The unsuccessful
Glass bill of 1932 included limited provisions for
statewide branching by national banks. Business
Week staked out the extreme position, announc-
ing that “what we really need is just one big
bank with 20,000 branches.” Supporters of
branch banking took heart in the Canadian ex-
perience:
Canada has branch banking, and Canada has
not had any bank failures during the depres-
sion. Is this a matter of cause and effect?
‘It is,’ declare the advocates of branch bank-
ing in the United States.””
Such highly concentrated branch networks
were offered as an alternative to deposit insur-
ance as a means of geographic diffusion of loan
losses and the diversification of credit risks.”
Comptroller Pole, of course, felt branching to
be the better option:
Any attempt to main~tainthe present country
bank system by force of legislation in the na-
ture of guaranty of deposits or the like, would
be economically unsound and would not accom-
plish the purpose intended.””
Deposit guaranties had long been advocated as a
way of diversifying risk for the unit bank with-
out a fundamental change in the ownership
“Sen. Glass, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3728.
“Anderson (1933c), p. 17.
“Pole (1929), p. 24.
“See Pole (1930a, 1931, 1932a and 1932b), “The Need of a
New Banking Policy” (1929) and “Comptroller Pole’s Views
on Rural Unit Banking” (1930).
“4U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Banking and Currency (1930).
“5”The Ideal Bank” (1933), p. 16.
““Greer (1933a), p. 722. See also Lawrence (1930), and Rep.
Bacon, Congressional Record (1933), pp. 3949-50.
“For example, Rep. Bacon, Congressional Record (1933), p.
3961, noted that “deposit guaranty is undoubtedly a
guaranty of reckless banking. ... Satety for the depositor
can best be achieved by a unified branch banking sys-
tem.”
““Pole (1930b), p. 5. This same sentence appears in Pole
(1930a), p. 4.structure of the banking industry.”” The vari-
ous histories of Populism, “Bryanism,” the Panic
of 1907 and the Pujo hearings all contained ele-
ments of a deep popular mistrust of money
center banks. The publicity of the Pecora hear-
ings in 1933 clearly did not assuage this mis-
trust. It was not pure coincidence that the
western agricultural states—the heart of the
Grange and Populist movements—had been the
ones to enact state deposit guaranties. In this
context, then, it is ironic that, in 1933, federal
deposit insurance should most often have been
viewed as a lethal threat to the country bank.
That it was such a threat testifies to the in-
fluence and legislative skill of Carter Glass.
Sen. Glass, who had shepherded the Federal
Reserve Act through the House in 1913, was
protective of his handiwork:
I took occasion to tell the Secretary of the
Treasury the other day that if they pursue
present policies much longer they will literally
wreck the Federal Reserve System; that
Woodrow Wilson in history will enjoy the dis-
tinction of having set up a banking system that
fought the war for us and saved the Nation in
the post-war period, and if they keep on mak-
ing a doormat of it this Congress will enjoy the
distinction of having wrecked it.”
His primary concern in the banking legislation
of 1933 was to buttress that system. Thus, the
Glass bill required all FDIC member banks to
join the Federal Reserve System, ostensibly to
give the Fed the legal right to examine FDIC
members (the Fed was to be a prominent share-
holder in the FDIC).” Because an uninsured
country bank facing insured competitors was
not considered viable, and because Fed member-
ship would require at least $25,000 minimum
capital, deposit insurance represented the end
for the small, state non-member banks.”
Deposit insurance would force a consolidation
of banking within the Federal Reserve System.
It is instructive to note that Glass had aban-
doned an earlier scheme that would have
forced the same consolidation within the Fed:
unification of banking in the National Banking
System. Comptroller Pole had sought to accom-
plish the same thing indirectly, by providing na-
tional banks with an undeniable competitive
advantage in the form of interstate branching
privileges. In 1932, Glass had requested of Gov.
Meyer of the Federal Reserve a constitutional
method of unifying banking:
Meyer: “Do you want to bring about unified
banking?”
“Why, undoubtedly, yes.”
“I shall be glad to help you.”
“I think the curse of the banking busi-
ness in this country is the dual
system.”
Meyer: “Then the Board is entirely in sympa-
thy with the Committee on the sub-
ject.””’
The result was a legal opinion prepared by the
General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Board
on the constitutionality of such unification in
the absence of a constitutional amendment.””
While Board Counsel confirmed that such a con-
stitutional means existed, Sen. Gore introduced
a constitutional amendment.”’ Constitutionality
was crucial, because champions of the rural
unit bank were certain to raise the powerful
specter of states’ rights in opposition:
The fight regarding the American Dual System
of Banking is a clear-cut issue between those
who believe in the sovereignty of our states
and home rule, and those who are in favor of a
‘unification of our banking system’ into one
Washington bureau.””
Indeed, the political sensitivity of the states’
rights issue was sufficient to force Sen. Glass to
abandon such a direct assault on the state banks
before it could earnestly begin.”
““White (1982, 1983, 1984) reviews the historical connections
between deposit insurance and bank chartering.
“Sen. Glass, Congressional Record (1933), p. 3728~
“See the interchange between Sens. Glass and Couzens
(R-Ml), Congressional Record (1933), p. 3727.
“Section 17 of the Glass bill “provides for the amount of
capital of national banks depending upon the population
of the places where they are to be located and also pro-
hibits the admission ofa bank into the Federal Reserve
System unless it possesses a paid-up unimpaired capital
sufficient to entitle it to become a national bank.” See
Glass (1933b), p. 16, (emphasis added). The population
schedule for minimum capital was: $25,000 for areas un-
der 3000 persons; $50,000 for 3000 to 6000 persons;
$100,000 for 6000 to 50;000 persons; $200,000 for areas
over 50,000 persons; see Steagall (1933a), pp. 18-19.
“Quoted by Anderson (1932b), p. 678.
“4The opinion was published as Wyatt (1933). The Attorney
General had felt it was not possible, and had told Glass
that; see Anderson (1932b), p. 678.
““Joint resolution S. J. Res. 18 was introduced by Sen. Gore
(D-OK), Congressional Record (1933), p. 249.
““Andrew (1934b), p. 95.
“See Burns (1874), pp. 11-12.
Glass:
Meyer:
Glass:Arrayed against Sen. Glass in the battle for
unification within the Fed was a coalition led by
Henry Steagall in the House and Huey Long in
the Senate.”” Sen. Long had crippled Glass’s
banking bill in the previous Congress with a
ten-day filibuster; as champion of the common
man, he had objected to an envisioned concen-
tration of power implicit in the bill’s branching
provisions.”” This coalition indeed viewed de-
posit insurance as a means of survival for the
small bank:
If there is one purpose more than another
which is inherent in the amendment which is
now at stake in this conference, it is the pur-
pose to protect the smaller banking institutions,
and to make the reopening of closed banks pos-
sible as speedily and as safely as it can be
done.’~°
The final legislation was a two-stage com-
promise between Sen. Glass’s push for unifica-
tion and the Steagall-Long coalition’s desire to
preserve the dual banking system. In the first
stage, Glass agreed to support a deposit guaranty
in exchange for provisions for significantly ex-
panded Federal Reserve authority:
With these provisions, dependent upon them in
fact, the Senate bill drafters were willing to ac-
cept the new Steagall bill for the insurance or
guaranty of bank deposits in Federal Reserve
member banks—but in member banks only.’”’
In the second stage, the dual banking support-
ers obtained several concessions, most notably:
immediate insurance coverage for non-member
banks under the temporary plan, and grand-
fathering of small state banks under the new’
minimum capital standards for Fed membership.
Non-member banks would still have to apply for
Federal Reserve membership by July 1, 1936, at
the latest. With these changes, Sen. Long sup-
ported the bill, which then passed the Senate
without objection.’”’
Prophesying thefuture of Federal Deposit Insur-
ance is at the same time both difficult and sim-
ple. It is difficult because the subject cannot be
treated independently, that is, without relation to
banking structure, banking practice, political and
economic trends and human emotions. It is easy,
on the other hand, because ... any man’s guess is
as good as that of another.’”’
It is obvious from an examination of the
record that the debate surrounding the adop-
tion of federal deposit insurance was both wide-
ranging and well informed. The banking crisis
in March 1933, coming at the depths of the
Great Depression and breaking on inauguration
day, had focused attention with unique intensity
on all aspects of public policy toward banks.
While some contended that the urgency accom-
panying the crisis injected haste into the
proceedings, it also ensured that all major in-
terests were roused to offer their views and ar-
gue their cases.
““See Anderson (1933a), p. 17. They were loined by Sen.
Vandenberg, whose temporary plan extended insurance to
state non-member banks upon certification of soundness
by the relevant state banking authority.
““There was little fondness connecting the two Southern
Democrats. Smith and Beasley (1939), pp. 346-47, relate
that, in the heat of the banking debate and in response to
a series of Long’s ad hominems, Glass unleashed a string
of invective that literally chased the Kingfish — his hands
clamped over his ears — off the Senate floor. This version
of events is apocryphal, however.
~
4
O5~~ Vandenberg, referring to the temporary insurance
amendment, Congressional Record (1933), p. 5256. See
also Vandenberg (1933), p. 43.
‘“‘Anderson (1933a), p. 63.
‘42Rep. Luce reported that bank structure issues predominat-
ed in the conference committee reconciling the Glass and
Steagall bills: “There were but two points of serious con-
troversy in the discussions of the conferees — those to
which I have just referred, branch banking, the member-
ship requirement together with other details of insurance
of bank deposits,” Congressional Record (1933), p. 5896.
Much of the force of Glass’s requirements for Fed mem-
bership was lost when deposit insurance was revamped
by the Banking Act of 1935; see, for example, Woosley
(1936), pp. 24-26. See also the shaded insert on the fol-
lowing page. The membership requirement was dropped
entirely in 1939; see Golembe (1967), pp. 1098-1100.
Opinions varied on the significance of the consolidation
of bank regulation implicit in the final act. Bankers Maga-
zine editorialized that, “while this development will bring
the state banks under a considerable degree of Federal
control, it will not — for a time at least — result in that
unification of banking regarded by many as desirable. The
state banks, by coming into the deposit-guaranty scheme
have escaped with their lives.” “State Banks Qualifying for
Insurance of Deposits” (1933), p. 490. Anderson (1933c),
p. 17, warned that, “with all this variation, this glorification
of the unit bank principle, however, comes the hard fact
that these institutions, for the first time in their history, will
be under one direct control whose authority is such as
practically to set aside all the principle privileges for
which state banks have fought so long.”
‘“‘Amberg (1935), p. 49.it has been suggested that the framers of the 1935 significantly weakened the requirements
Banking Act of 1933 failed to consider the
warnings about the potential dangers of
government-sponsored deposit insurance.’~~ It is
significant, then, that an examination of the
historical record clearly shows that bill’s chief
patrons were aware of the failure of the state
schemes, the actuarial arguments against
deposit guaranties, and the various chartering
issues involved. Moreover, they took these is-
sues into account when crafting the bill. In the
end, even the Association of Reserve City
Bankers was able to recommend the temporary
insurance plan:
tt appears to this Commission that if guaranty
is retained after July 1, 1934 [the date for im-
plementation of the permanent plani, this tern-
porary plan, in sonic modified form, would
meet every emergency need, and eliminate
many of the dangers in the permanent plan.’~~
Under the temporary plan, coverage ceilings
were conservative, the insurance corporation
was emphatically segregated from the federal
taxpayer, chartering standards for national
banks were raised, and supervisory authority
was broadly increased. These characteristics
were retained under the permanent plan of the
Banking Act of 1935. As such, deposit insur-
ance, as construed in the Banking Acts of 1933
and 1935, succeeded in simultaneously protect-
ing the small depositor and leaving the banker
answerable to both supervisors and large depos-
itors for the quality of his management.
At the same time, the deposit insurance provi-
sions of the Banking Act of 1933 were used as
leverage to consolidate the industry within the
Federal Reserve, although the Banking Act of
for Fed membership of insured banks. A
piecemeal dismantling of other provisions of the
original legislation has also occurred in the in-
tervening decades: coverage ceilings have risen
steadily, even after accounting for inflation and
before considering brokered deposits or too-big-
to-fail policies; the full taxing authority of the
U. S. ‘Freasury has, defacto, been inserted behind
the deposit insurance corporations; and deregu-
lation has subjected both banks and thrifts to
increasingly harsher competition—and, in some
cases, relaxed regulatory scrutiny—without
simultaneously making bankers responsible to
depositors for the riskiness of bank assets.’4°It
is perhaps with this more recent negation of in-
dividual elements of a complex and interdepen-
dent package of bank reforms that we should
seek the proximate cause of our recent deposit
insurance troubles, rather than with policy
flaws in the Banking Act of 1933 itself.
This list of references contains several sources that are rele-
vant to the debate, but which are not cited directly in the text.
These additional references are included to provide others in-
terested in the topic with a more comprehensive listing of the
primary source materials.
“A Good Start,” Bus/ness Week (March 22, 1933), p. 32.
Amberg, Harold V. “The Future of Deposit Insurance,” As-
sociation of Reserve City Bankers: Proceedings, Twenty-
fourth Annual Convention (1935), pp. 49-61.
American Bankers Association (ABA). “The Guaranty of
Bank Deposits,” (Economic Policy Commission: American
Bankers Association, New York, 1933a).
________ “Forum Discussion—Uniform Banking Law—Guar-
antee of Deposits,” Commercial and Financ/a/ Chronicle
(American Bankers Convention Supplement, September 23,
1933b), pp. 58-59.
““Kaufman, for example, claims that the opinions of Emer-
son (1934)— and, by association, those of the banking
community as a whole — regarding flaws in the actuarial
basis for the plan were unheeded at the time.
In particular, Kaufman (1990) states, pp. 1-2: “Some of
the problems are new, however many have been around
for many years and were even clearly foreseen at the time
they were forming or, worse yet, even earlier. at the time
their underlying causes were put in place in the form of
legislation or regulation. This is the case with the extant
structure of federal deposit insurance. Among those fore-
casting the problems that this innovation would come to
cause was Guy Emerson, a long-time economist for the
Bankers Trust Company (New York). His warnings are evi-
dentin his article “Guaranty of Deposits Under the Bank-
ing Act of 1933” published in the February 1934 Quarterly
Journal of Economics and reprinted in this volume. Much
of this book is necessitated because policy makers did not
listen to Emerson and others more than half a century
ago.” Related remarks appear on pp. xi-xii of the preface
to the same volume.
‘“tmAssociation of Reserve City Bankers (1933), p. 7. They
were, however, at pains not to appear eager in their
praise: “What we are recommending, therefore, is co-
operation in an emergency measure of fhe sort that has
been deemed necessary in a/most all branches of oureco-
nomic life, but we are not, directly or indirectly, endorsing
the principle ofdeposit guaranty” ibid., p. 7. (emphasis in
the original). The permanent plan was never operational;
it was in fact ultimately superseded by a modified form of
the temporary plan.
‘“6The technical legal question of the de jure liability of the
United States government for deposit insurance is surpris-
ingly complex, and the answer is not entirely clear. As a
practical matter, however, the question is neither complex
nor unclear. See FDIC (1990). pp. 4438-39.74
“Report of Resolutions Committee—Insurance of
Deposits Declared Unsound,” Commercial and Financial
Chronicle (American Bankers Convention Supplement, Sep-
tember 23, 1933c), p. 59.
American Savings, Building and Loan Institute. Guarantee of
Bank Deposits and Building and Loan (American Savings,
Building and Loan Institute, Chicago, 1933).
Anderson, George E. “The Glass Bill is a Medley,” Amer/can
Bankers Association Journal (February 1932a), pp. 498,
532-35.
“Washington Looks at the State Banks,” American
Bankers Associat/on Journal (May 1932b), pp. 677-78, 718,
_______- “Bank Law Making,” American Bankers Associa-
tion Journal (May 1933a), pp. 17, 63.
________ “The Price of Deposit Insurance,” American
Bankers Association Journal (October 1933b), pp.17-19, 51.
“Washington Epic: II. Prospectus—National Finan-
cial Control,” American BankersAssociation Journal
(November 1933c), pp. 16-17, 48.
“Deposit Insurance, First Phase,” American
Bankers Assoc/ation Journal (January 1934a), pp. 20-21.
______ “Bank Owners,” Banking (November 1934b),
pp. 11-12.
Andrew, L. A. “Reconstruction: Individual Initiative,” Amen-
can Bankers Association Journal(January 1934a), pp. 15-
16, 53, 69.
______ “The Future of the Unit Bank,” Proceedings of the
Forty-fourth Annual Convention of the Missouri Bankers As-
sociation (1934b), pp. 91-101.
“Are State Banks to be Suppressed?,” Bankers Magazine
(November 1929), pp. 663-64.
Association of Reserve City Bankers, Commission on Bank-
ing Law and Practice. “The Guaranty of Bank Deposits[
Bulletin No. 3, (Chicago, November 1933).
Await, F G. Annual Report of the Comptroller ot the Cur-
rency, 1932 (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1933).
“Bank BilL” Business Week (June 10, 1933), p. 8.
“Bank Reform,” Business Week (January 4, 1933), pp. 3-4.
“Banking Issues in the Campaign,” Amer/can Bankers As-
sociation Journal (August 1932), pp. 22, 65.
‘Banking Reform,” Bus/ness Week (March 8, 1933), p. 32.
“The Banks Reopen,” Business Week (March 22, 1933),
pp. 3-4.
Beebe, M. Plin. “A National View of State Banks:’ American
Bankers Assoc/ation Journal (October 1931), pp. 217-18, 287.
Bell, Elliott V. “The Bankers Sign a Truce,” Current History
(December 1934), pp. 257-63.
“Who Shall Rule the Money Market?,” Current
History (July 1935), pp. 353-59.
Bennett, Frank F, Jr. “A Word to National Banks:’ Ameri-
can Bankers Association Journal (October 1931), pp. 232-
33, 272.
Benson, Philip A. “Government Guaranty of Bank Deposits,”
American Bankers Assoc/ation Journal (December 1932),
pp. 14-15, 69.
Benston, George J. The Separation of Commercial and In-
vestment Banking: The Glass-Steagal/ Act Revisited and
Reconsidered (Oxford University Press, New York, 1990),
Berle, A. A., Jr. “Reconstruction: Central Control,” American
Bankers Association Journal (January 1934), pp. 13-14, 52,
68-69.
Blocker, John G. “The Guaranty of State Bank Deposits,”
Bureau of Business Research of the University of Kansas,
Kansas Studies in Business No. 11, (Department of Jour-
nalism Press, Lawrence, 1929).
Boeckel, Richard M. The Guaranty of Bank Deposits (Editor-
ial Research Reports, Washington, D. C., 1932).
Bogen, Jules I., and Marcus Nadler. The Banking Crisis
(Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1933).
Bradford, Frederick A. “Futility of Deposit Guaranty Laws,”
Bankers Magazine (June 1933), pp. 537-39.
Brandeis, Louis D. Other Peop/e’s Money and How the
Bankers Use It (National Home Library Foundation,
Washington, 1933).
Bremer, C. D, American Bank Failures (Columbia University
Press, New York, 1935).
Burns, Helen M. The American Banking Community and New
Deal Banking Reforms 1933-1935 (Greenwood Press, West-
port, 1974).
Calomiris, Charles W. “Deposit insurance: Lessons from the
record,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Econom/c Per-
spectives (May/June 1989), pp. 10-30.
_______ “Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Per-
spective,” Journal of Economic History (June 1990),
pp. 283-95.
Calverton, V. F “Is America Ripe for Fascism?,” Current
History (September 1933), pp. 701-04.
Carter, W. E. “Annual Address of the President:’ Proceed-
ings of the Forty-fourth Annual Convention of the Missouri
Bankers Associat/on (1934), pp. 21-27.
Chernow, Ron. The House of Morgan: An American Banking
Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance (Atlantic Monthly
Press, New York, 1990).
Collins, Charles W. Rural Banking Reform (MacMillan, New
York, 1931).
Colt, Charles C., and N. S. Keith. 26 Days: A History of the
Banking Crisis (Greenberg, New York, 1933).
“Comptroller Pole’s Views on Rural Unit Banking:’ Bankers
Magazine (April 1930), pp. 463-69.
“Congress Passes and President Roosevelt Signs Glass-
Steagall Bank Bill as Agreed on in Conference,” Commer-
cial and Financial Chronicle (June 17, 1933), pp. 4192-93.
Congress/onal Record (daily edition), 73d Congress, 1st Ses-
sion, (1933).
Crowley, Leo T. “The Benefits of Deposit Insurance,”
Proceedings of the Forty-fourth Annual Convention of the
Missouri Bankers Associat/on (1934), pp. 101-10.
______- “The Necessity of Cooperation Between State Su-
pervising Authorities and the FD.I.C1 (with discussion),
Proceedings ofthe Thirty-fourth Annual Convention of the
National Association of Supervisors of State Banks (Bran-
dao Printing, New Orleans, 1935), pp. 65-6&
Cummings, Walter J. “The Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration,” Bankers Magazine (November 1933), pp. 577-78.
Daiger, J. M. “Toward Safer and Stronger Banks,” Current
History (February 1933), pp. 558-564.
Danielian, N. R. “The Stock Market and the Public:’ Atlantic
Monthly (October 1933), pp. 496-508.
“Death of Francis H. Sisson, Vice-President Guaranty Trust
Co. of New York and Former President American Bankers
Association[ Commercial and Financial Chronicle (Septem-
ber 23, 1933), p. 2195.
De Long. J. Bradford. “Liquidation’ Cycles: Old-Fashioned
Real Business Cycle Theory and the Great Depression,”
NBER Working Paper (October 1990).75
“Deposit Insurance:’ Business I~ek(April 12, 1933a), p. 3. Fisher, Irving. “Statement of Prof. Irving Fisher, Professor of
Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.,” in To Pro- “Deposit Insurance:’ Bus/ness Week (May 31, 1933b), p. 20. vide a Guaranty Fund for Depositors /n Banks, U. S. Con-
“Deposit Insurance Draws Near,” Review of Reviews and gress, House of Representatives, Committee on Banking
World’s Work (December 1933), pp. 50-51. and Currency. Hearings, 72d Congress, 1st Session (U. S.
“Depositors Want Insurance[ Business Week (June 7 Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1932), pp.
1933), p. 12. 143-54.
Dyer, Gus W. “Federal Control of Business,” Proceed/ngs of Flynn, John T. “The Wall Street Water Pump:’ Harper’s
the Forty-third Annual Convention of the Missouri Bankers Monthly Magazine (September 1933), pp. 404-13.
Association (1933), ~ 9198. _______. “Wanted: Real Banking Reform:’ Current H/story
Elliott, W. S. “State Banks and the Future Thereof” (with (January 1934), pp. 394-401.
discussion), Proceedings of the Thirty-fourth Annual Conven- “For Better Banks:’ Bus/ness Week (May 17, 1933), p. 5.
t/on of the National Assoc/at/on ofSupervisors of State
Banks (Brandao Printing, New Orleans, 1935), pp. 80-85. Ford, Henry. “Essentials of Sound Banking,” Rotartan (April
Emerson, Guy. “Guaranty of Deposits Under the Banking 1933), pp. 6-9, 56-57.
Act of 1933,” Quarterly Journal of Econom/cs (February Fox, Mortimer J. “Deposit Insurance as an Influence for
1934), pp. 229-244. Stabilizing the Banking Structure,” Journal ofthe American
Stat/st/cal Association (March 1936), pp. 103-12. “Extension of Branch Banking:’ Bankers Magazine (Novem-
ber 1929), pp. 661-63. Friedman, Milton, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). “History of History of the United States 1867-1960 (Princeton University
Legislation for the Guaranty or Insurance of Bank Press, Princeton, 1963).
Deposits,” Annual Report of the Federal Deposit Insurance Galbraith, John K. The Great Crash, 1929 (Houghton Mifflin,
Corporation, 1950 (FDIC, Washington. D.C., 1951), Boston, 1961).
pp. 61-101.
Gayer, A. D. “The Banking Act of 1935,” Quarterly Journal of
_______- “Insurance of Bank Obligations Prior to Federal Economics (November 1935), pp. 97-116.
Deposit Insurance:’ Annual Report of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 1952 (FDIC, Washington, D.C., Glass, Carter. “Carter Glass urges the Need of Banking Re-
1953), pp. 57-72. form,” Review of Reviews and World’s Work (January
_______ “State Deposit Insurance Systems, 1908-1930:’ An- 1933a), pp. 20-22.
nual Report ofthe Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, _______. “Operation of the National and Federal Reserve
1956 (FDIC, Washington, D.C., 1957), pp. 45-73. Banking Systems: Report to accompany S. 1631:’ 73d Con-
_______ Federal Depos/t Insurance Corporat/on: The First gress, 1st Session, Senate, Report No, 77 (May 15, 1933b).
Fifty Years (FDIC, Washington, D.C., 1984). “The Glass and Steagall Bills:’ Amer/can Bankers Association
________ “Are Deposits in Financial Institutions Guaranteed Journal (June 1933), pp. 22-23.
Directly by the Federal Government or by the FDIC and its “The Glass Bill:’ Business Week (May 24, 1933), p. 32.
Resources,” FDIC Advisory Opinion FDIC-90-6, in: Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation: Law, Regulations and Re- Golembe, Carter. “The Deposit insurance Legislation of 1933:
lafed Acts, Volume 1 (Prentice-HaIl, 1990), pp. 4438-39. An Examination of its Antecedents and its Purposes:’ P01/ti-
ca/Sc/ence Quarterly(June 1960), pp. 181-200. “Federal Guaranty of Bank Deposits:’ Bankers Magazine
(April 1932), pp. 380-82. _______. “Our Remarkable Banking System:’ Virgin/a Law
Federal Reserve Board. “Guaranty of Bank Deposits,” Federal Review (June 1967), pp. 1091-1114.
Reserve Bullet/n, (September 1925a), pp. 626-40. Greer, Guy. “Why Canadian Banks Don’t Fail,” Harper’s
_______ “State laws relating to guaranty of bank deposits,” Monthly Magaz/ne (May 1933a), pp. 722-34.
Federal Reserve Bulletin, (September 1925b), pp. 641-68. ,,, . “Wanted: Real Banking Reform,” Harper’s Monthly
_______ “Recent amendments to the Federal reserve act Magaz/ne (October 1933b), pp. 533-46.
(Glass-Steagall bill),” Federal Reserve Bullet/n, (March, Grodsky, Marcia. “Charles Ponzi,” in Larry Schweikart, ed.,
1932), ~ 180-81. Encycloped/a of Amer/can Bus/ness History and Biography
_______- “Review of the Month:’ Federal Reserve Bulletin. Banking and Finance, 1913-1989 (Facts On File, New York,
(March 1933a), pp. 113-33. 1990), pp. 355-59.
“Banking Act of 1933,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, “Guaranty of Deposits: How Can This Threat To Sound Bank-
(June 1933b), pp. 385-401. ing Be Met?,” Amer/can Bankers Association Journal (Sep-
_______ “Review of the Month,” Federal Reserve Bullet/n, tember 1933), p. 96.
(July 1933c), pp. 413-lB. Hapgood, Norman. “Protect the Depositor,” Nat/on (March 15,
_______- Twentieth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve 1933), p. 283.
Board, Covering Operat/ons for the Year 1933 (U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, 1934a). Harris, S. E. “Banking and Currency Legislation, 1932:’
Quarterly Journal of Econom/cs (May 1932), pp. 546-57. “Act of June 16, 1934, extending for I year the tem-
porary plan for deposit insurance, etc.’ Federal Reserve Hecht, Rudolf S. “The Banking Outlook” (with discussion),
Bulletin, (July 1934b), pp. 486-88. Proceed/ngs ofthe Thirty-fourth Annual Convent/on of the
“Banking Act of 1935,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, NationalAssociation of Supervisors of State Banks (Bran-
(September 1935), pp. 602-22. dao Printing, New Orleans. 1935), pp. 42-49.
Banking and Monetary Stat/st/cs, 1914-1941 (U. 5 “The Ideal Bank,” Bus/ness Week (April 19, 1933), p. 16.
Government Printing Office. Washington, 1943). Ives, Mitchell. “How Banks Have Been Saved,” American
“Final Chapter in the History of Bank Deposit Guaranty,” Bankers Assoc/at/on Journal (August 1931), pp. 71-74,
Bankers Magazine (April 1930), p. 472. 112-13.
~ ‘~r,:c,”~Jamison, C. L. “Bank Deposit Guaranties: The Insurance
Aspects of the Problem,” Bankers Magazine (May 1933),
pp. 451-55.
Jones, Homer. “Insurance of Bank Deposits in the United
States of America:’ Econom/c Journal (December 1938),
pp. 695-706.
Kane, Edward J. “The S&L Insurance Mess:’ Center for the
Study of American Business, Contemporary Issues Series,
No. 41 (February 1991).
Kaufman, George G. “Purpose and Operation of the Shadow
Financial Regulatory Committee:’ in George G. Kaufman,
ed., Restructuring the American Financ/al System (Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Boston, 1990).
Kelly, Edward J., III. “Legislative History of the Glass-Steagail
Act,” in Ingo Walter, ed., Deregu/ating Wall Street (John
Wiley, New York, 1985), pp. 41-65.
Kennedy, Susan Estabrook. The Banking Cr/s/s of 1933
(University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1973).
Kent, Frank R. “The Next President,” Scribners Magazine
(November 1932), pp. 257-261.
Keynes, John M., in Donald Moggridge, ed., The General The-
ory andAfter: Part 1 Preparation (Macmillan Press, 1973).
Kiplinger, Willard M. “The Reconstruction Workshop,” Ameri-
can Bankers Association Journal (April 1932), pp. 619, 634,
644.
Landon, Alt. M. “The Necessity of a Strong State Banking
System Without a Deposit Guaranty,” Commercialand
F/nanc/al Chronicle (American Bankers Convention Supple-
ment, September 23, 1933), pp. 50-53.
Law, Francis M. “Banking and the Country:’ Proceedings of
the Forty-fourth Annual Convention of the Missouri Bankers
Assoc/at/on (1934), pp. 37-44.
Lawrence, Joseph Stagg. Banking Concentration in the Un/ted
States: A Critical Analysis (Bankers Publishing Company,
New York, 1930).
_______ “Are Big Banks More Profitable?” Bankers Maga-
zine (January 1931), pp. 9-13.
“Burying the Banker,” Review of Rev/ews and
World’s Work(June 1934), pp. 19-23.
Love, J. S. “President’s Address,” Proceedings of the Thirty-
first Annual Convention of the National Association of Super-
visors of State Banks (Brandao Printing, New Orleans,
1932), pp. 25-31.
Martin, Tiarr. “Louis Thomas McFadden’ in Larry Schwei-
kart, ed, Encyclopedia of American Bus/ness H/story and
B/ography, Banking and F/nance, 1913-1989 (Facts On File,
New York, 1990), pp. 248-50.
McLaughlin, George V “The Need for Revision of the Glass-
Steagall Act and a Sane Legislative Program for Banking:’
Commerc/a/ and F/nancial Chronicle (American Bankers
Convention Supplement, September 23, 1933), pp. 16-19.
McWhirter, Felix M. “The Unit Bank Accepts the Challenge,”
American Bankers Association Journal (July 1932),
pp. 11-13, 61-62.
“Modern Paradoxes:’ Bankers Magazine (August 1933),
p. 119.
Nahm, Max B. “Report of Resolutions Committee —Tributes
in Memory of Francis H. Sisson, Peter W. Goebel and Mel-
vin A. Traylor,” Commercial and Financial Chronicle (Ameri-
can Bankers Convention Supplement, November 17, 1934),
p. 30.
National Industrial Conference Board. The Banking Situation
/n the United States (National Industrial Conference Board,
New York, 1932).
“The Need of a New Banking Policy.” Bankers Magazine
(November 1929), pp. 659-61.
“New Bank Bills:’ Bus/ness Week (May 24, 1933), pp. 5-6.
“The New Banking Picture:’ American Bankers Association
Journal (April 1933), pp. 11-13, 37.
“New Banks — Model T,” Bus/ness Week (March B, 1933), pp.
5-6.
“The ‘New Deal in Banking’:’ Bus/ness Week (June 24, 1933),
pp. 22-23.
“New Deal, New Money, New Banks,” Bus/ness Week (March
15, 1933), pp. 3-4.
O’Connor, James F. 7. “Defense of Banking Act of 1933 —
Deposit Insurance Provision,” Commercial and Financial
Chronicle (American Bankers Convention Supplement, Sep-
tember 23, 1933), pp. 23-27.
“Temporary Deposit Insurance:’ American Bankers
Assoc/ation Journal (January 1934), p. 21.
_______- “Address by J. F. O’Connor, Comptroller of the Cur-
rency” (with discussion), Proceedings of the Thirty-fourth
Annual Convent/on of the National Association of Supervi-
sors ofState Banks (Brandao Printing, New Orleans, 1935),
pp. 95-105.
Ogg, Frederic A. “Does America Need a Dictator?” Current
History (September 1932), pp. 641-48.
“Opinions on the New Banking Act, Charted from West to
East,” American Bankers Association Journal (September
1933), pp. 22-23, 50, 52, 58.
“Other People’s Money:’ Business Week (April 5, 1933),
p. 9.
“Our Orgy of Speculation’ Bankers Magazine (December
1929), pp. 907-08.
Paton, Thomas B. “16 Deposit Guaranty Bills in Congress:’
American Bankers Association Journal (April 1932),
pp. 621, 652.
Pecora, Ferdinand. Wall Street Under Oath (Simon and
Schuster, New York, 1939).
“Permanent Bank Reform:’ Bus/ness Week (March 29, 1933),
p. a
Phillips, Ronnie J. “The ‘Chicago Plan’ and New Deal Bank-
ing Reform,” Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Working
Paper No. 76 (June 1992).
Platt, Edmund. “Branch Banking: A Reply:’ Amer/can
Bankers Association Journal (August 1932), pp. 13-IS,
62-65.
Pole, John W. “Plight of National Banking System,” Bankers
Magazine (July 1929), pp. 23-26.
_______- Report of the Comptrollerof the Currency 1929
(U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
I930a).
_______ “Statement of Hon. John W. Pole, Comptroller of
the Currency:’ in Branch, Chain, and Group Banking
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Banking and Currency, Hearings, 71st Congress, 2d Ses-
sion, Volume 1 (U. S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C., 1930b), pp. 3-419.
Reportof the Comptroller of the Currency, 1930
(U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1931).
Reportof the Comptroller of the Currency, 1931
(U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
1932a).
_______- “Statement of Hon. John W. Pole, Comptroller of
the Currency,” in To Provide a Guaranty Fund for Depositors
in Banks, U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Com-mittee on Banking and Currency. Hearings, 72d Congress,
1st Session (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D. C., 1932b), pp. 6-56.
Preston, Howard H. “The Banking Act of 1933:’ Amer/can
Economic Review (December 1933), pp. 585-607.
Preston, Thomas R. “As a Southern Banker Views the Situa-
tion,” American Bankers Assoc/ation Journal (August 1932),
p. 15.
“Protecting Bank Depositors,” Bankers Magazine (April 1931),
pp. 433-35.
Robb, Thomas B. The Guaranty of Bank Depos/ts (Houghton
Mifflin, Boston, 1921).
Robinson, A. C. “The Moral Values of Thrift:’ American
Bankers Association Journal (October 1931), pp. 209-11,
285-86.
Roosevelt, Franklin D. The Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt Volume Two, The Year of Crisis, 1933
(Random House, 1938).
Salter, Sir Arthur. “A New Economic Morality,” Harper’s
Monthly Magazine (May 1933), pp. 641-49.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of
Upheaval (Houghton Mifflin, 1960).
Sisson, Francis H. “The Strength of Our Banking System,”
Review of Reviews and World’s Work (December 1932), pp.
30-32, 71.
_______- “How We May Have Safer Banks: The Solution
Does Not Lie in the Government Guaranty of Deposits:’
Bankers Magazine (June 1933a), pp. 563-65.
_______ “Annual Address of the President,” Commerc/al and
Financial Chronicle (American Bankers Convention Supple-
ment, September 23, 1933b), pp. 30-33.
Smith, Rixey, and Norman Beasley. Carter Glass: A Biogra-
phy (Longmans, Green and Co., 1939).
“Start[ American Bankers Association Journal (January 1934),
p. 80.
“State Banks Qualifying for Insurance of Deposits,” Bankers
Magazine (November 1933), pp. 489-90.
Steagall, Henry B. “Banking Act of 1933: Report to accompa-
ny HR. 5661:’ 73d Congress, 1st Session, House of
Representatives, Report No. ISO (May 19, I933a).
“Banking Act of 1933: Conference Report to ac-
company HR. 5661:’ 73d Congress, 1st Session, House of
Representatives, Report No. 251 (June 12, 1933b).
Stephenson, Rome C. “Providing Safety for Future Banking,”
Bankers Magaz/ne (May 1931), pp. 591-94.
“Making Banks Safe:’ Rotarian (September 1934),
pp. 34-35, 46-48.
Taggart, J. H., and L. D. Jennings. “The Insurance of Bank
Deposits’ Journal ot Political Economy (August, 1934), pp.
508-16.
Taussig, F. W. “Doctors, Economists, and the Depression,”
Harper’s Monthly Magazine (August 1932), pp. 355-65.
Timmons, Bascom N. Garner of Texas: A Personal History
(Harper & Brothers, 1948).
“Unit Banking Not So Bad After All:’ Bankers Magazine (April
1930), p. 470.
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Banking and Currency. Branch, Chain, and Group Banking,
Hearings, 71st Congress, 2d Session (U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1930).
Upham, Cyril B., and Edwin Lamke. Closed and Distressed
Banks: A Study in Public Administrat/on (The Brookings In-
stitution, 1934).
Vandenberg, Arthur H. “A Defense of the Bank Deposit Insur-
ance Law and an Answer to the American Bankers Associ-
ation” (with discussion), Proceedings of the Thirty-second
Annual Convention of the National Association of Supervi-
sors of State Banks (Brandao Printing, 1933), pp. 38-67.
Warburg, Paul M. “A Banking System Adrift at Sea,” Bankers
Magazine (March 1929), pp. 569-73.
Warburton, Clark. Deposit /nsurance in Eight States During
the Period 1908-1930, unpublished manuscript, (FDIC
1959).
“Origin, Development, and Problems of Deposit In-
surance:’ Lectures in Monetary Economics, mimeo, Univer-
sity of California at Davis (1967).
“Washington and the Banks:’ Business Week (March 8,
1933), pp. 3-4.
“Washington Reads the Signs,” Bus/ness Week (March 15,
1933), pp. 4-5.
Watkins, Myron W. “The Literature of the Crisis:’ Quarterly
Journal of Econom/cs (May 1933), pp. 504-32.
Westerfield, Ray B. “Defects in American Banking,” Current
History (April 1931), pp. 17-23.
_______ “The Banking Act of 1933:’ Journal ofPolitical
Economy (December 1933), pp. 721-49.
“What’II We Use For Money?” Bus/ness Week (January 11,
1933), pp. 10-11.
Wheelock, David C. “Monetary Policy in the Great Depres-
sion: What the Fed Did, and Why,” this Review (MarchfApril
1992a), pp. 3-28.
“Deposit Insurance and Bank Failures: New Evi-
dence from the 1920s,” Economic Inquiry (July 1992b),
pp. 530-43.
“Regulation and Bank Failures: New Evidence from
the Agricultural Collapse of the 1920s,” Journal ofEconom-
ic History (forthcoming 1992c).
Wheelock, David C., and Subal C. Kumbhaker. “Which Banks
Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection
and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System:’ Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 91-005A
(September 1991).
White, Eugene Nelson. “The Political Economy of Banking
Regulation, 1864-1933:’ Journal of Economic History (March
1982), pp. 33-40.
_______ The Regulation and Reform of the American Bank-
ing System, 1900-1929 (Princeton University Press,1983).
________ “A Reinterpretation of the Banking Crisis of i9so:’
Journal of Economic H/story (March 1984), pp. 119-138.
Willis, H. Parker. “What Shall We Do with Our Banks?” Na-
tion (April 13, 1932), pp. 422-425.
_______- “The Banking Act of 1933 — An Appraisal:’ Ameri-
can Econom/c Association: Papers and Proceedings (March
1934), pp. 101-110.
Willis, H. Parker, and John M. Chapman. The Banking Situa-
tion (Columbia University Press, New York, 1934).
Woollen, Evans. “The Insurance of Bank Deposits:’ Atlant/c
Monthly (November 1933), pp. 609-611.
Woosley, John B. “The Permanent Plan for the Insurance of
Bank Deposits:’ Southern Economic Journal (April 1936),
pp. 20-44.
Wyatt, Walter. “Constitutionality of Legislation Providing a
Unitied Commercial Banking System for the United
States’ Federal Reserve Bulletin (March 1933),
pp. 166-86.